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ABSTRACT
Sales of services are becoming a major source of revenues across industries. The shift
towards services has been exacerbated as human capital has gained in importance in the
"knowledge economy." And yet, products businesses have historically attracted, and are
still attracting, most of the attention of managers and scholars.
Centering on the information technology services industry, this thesis analyzes the
strategy, structure, and performance of services firms. We analyze the information
technology services industry and propose a framework to determine the drivers of
performance of information technology services firms. The framework is applied to a
database of 831 information technology services firms from 1990 to 2004.
Chapter II provides an insight into the dynamics of the information technology industry.
Chapter III then focuses on the specificities, characteristics and structure of the
information technology services firms. In Chapter IV, the business model of services
firms is contrasted with that of products firms. Inter-relations between the two business
models are proposed. Chapter V introduces a strategic management framework and
applies it to the definition of drivers of performance of IT services firms, which are
analyzed in Chapter VI, and contrasted with those of software firms.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael A. Cusumano
Sloan Management Review Professor of Management
Head of the IT Products and Services Research Group, MIT Center for eBusiness
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
From a focus on the production of tangible goods, the creation of value in the economy of
OECD countries has shifted toward the production and management of intangible goods.
In this context, capabilities have become critical and services have taken a central role in
the economy. For instance, in the case of after-sales services, a study showed that
businesses derived 24% of their revenues from such services (Cohen and Agrawal 2006).
These services accounted for 45% of their gross profit. Yet services have often been
overlooked by managers and scholars.
A recent study developed by the European Commission (The Prism Report 2003) states
that:
The principal source of economic value and wealth is no longer the production of
material goods, but lies in the creation, acquisition and exploitation of intangibles.
Economic growth is influenced less by investments in physical capital (land,
machinery, stocks of goods) than by knowledge, which is now a critical factor in
the productive application and exploitation of physical capital. Consequently,
competitive success today requires a critical capacity to develop, manage,
measure and control the flow of knowledge and intangibles.
This general trend is particularly clear in the high tech industries where hardware (the
tangible part of the offerings) has generated a demand for software and services (the
intangible part of the offerings). More generally, and paradoxically, as technology has
evolved to solve increasingly complex problems, the skills required to manage the
technology and apply it to concrete problems - and more specifically, to business
problems - has been at the core of a need for skills and a demand for services.
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The trend toward services has been accelerated by the dynamics of commoditization of
products. In the case of the IT business, Carr emphasized, in his famous Harvard
Business Review article "IT Doesn't Matter" (2003), that IT products had become
increasingly commoditized. Moreover, economists such as Jorgenson (2001) showed that
the prices of computers were falling at a faster rate relative to those of software and
services. It is thus no wonder that software and services have gained in importance in the
economy to the point that the share of the US domestic IT income has shifted from a
predominance of hardware income to a predominance of software and services (Fig. 1-1).
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Figure 1-1 Repartition of US gross domestic income from hardware, and software and services -
telecom excluded.
(source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990-2004)
It is also interesting to note from Fig. 1-1 the relative growth of the software and services
industries compared to the hardware industry during economic growth, and their relative
resilience when facing economic downturn: software and services incomes grew faster
and were also more resilient to economic downturn than hardware income. Services and
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products businesses clearly have different characteristics that can be leveraged in
different ways. Thus, in addition to having an economic value, understanding the
business of services has an important strategic value.
In order to better understand the business of professional services, we focus our study on
IT services, which include services such as system integration, maintenance, and IT
outsourcing, but also business process engineering and management consulting. We look
into the characteristics, strategies, business models, and key drivers of performance of IT
services firms.
Chapter II explores the historical roots of the IT industry in order to understand the
dynamics according to which IT services have evolved. Dissecting the dynamics of this
industry enables us to understand the drivers of the demand for IT services and how the
industry is structured.
Chapters III and IV develop frameworks to analyze IT services businesses. Chapter III
focuses on the specificities of services operations. This chapter is crucial in order to go
past the paradigms specifically developed for products businesses and understand the
levers of performance that are specific to IT services firms. In Chapter IV, products and
services businesses are compared and related to each other. We see how strategies and
business models are different and how synergies might be developed.
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Chapter V introduces a strategic management framework to analyze the drivers of
performance of IT services firms. The literature on strategic management is reviewed and
different levers of performance are discussed. Chapter VI applies the framework of
Chapter V in a quantitative analysis of the performance of IT services firms. Using the
same framework, the drivers of performance of IT services firms are also compared with
those of software firms. The interpretations proposed lead to the conclusion.
15
CHAPTER 2 The Evolution of the IT Services Industry and
Subsequent Strategies
The IT industry's growth cycles were fueled by the series of opportunities that came in
waves since the industry's inception - the emergence of the ISVs in the early 1970s, the
minicomputer in the 1970s, the microcomputer in the 1980s, and ERP systems and the
Internet in the 1990s. Evolving from the mere provision of data processing services to the
re-engineering of business processes, the IT services industry has changed in many ways.
Understanding what led to these changes is important to the understanding of the
dynamics and structure of the IT services market. We shall thus consider IT services
within the broader context of the IT industry.
2.1. From the industrial economy to the knowledge economy
2.1.1. The beginnings of the IT value chain
If we trace the IT industry back to 1951, when the first general-purpose computer for
commercial use was sold under the name of Universal Automatic Computer (UNIVAC),
we can observe the gradual formation of the IT industry value chain as we know it today
- i.e., with its three main components: hardware, software, and services (Mahoney 1998).
Words and concepts such as "software" or "IT services" would not appear before some
time because they were totally embedded in the offerings of hardware vendors or within
the activities of the firm. However, it is interesting to watch these concepts taking shape
16
in order to understand the context in which the IT services emerged, how they emerged
and developed, and led to the structure of the IT industry as we know it today.
Back in the early 1950s, the word "computer" still meant a person who conducted
mathematical calculations. The purpose of the new breed of "electric computers" that
UNIVAC was part of was to replace human services. By taking over the work of humans,
these computers were also supposed to radically impact cost models of firms replacing
certain types of hourly paid personnel with fixed-cost computers. The "software" - a
word coined by a professor from Princeton University in 1958 (Peterson 2000) - was
typically designed internally by the owners of UNIVAC systems or supplied with the
computer systems.
The 1960s were characterized by the dominance of mainframe systems, which were large
computing systems sold bundled with their software (Cusumano 2004). It was not until
1969 that software was sold separately, after IBM faced anti-trust suits from the US
government pushing the company to unbundle its offerings, and forcing it to charge
separately for hardware and software (Ceruzzi 1999). IBM's decision was quickly
followed by the emergence of independent software vendors (ISV) and the formation of a
new layer in the value chain of the computing industry (Fig. 2-1).
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the rise of the minicomputer and microcomputers (also
called personal computers) were announcing a new era of the computing industry. These
low-cost computers made computing technology more pervasive and led to its wide
17
adoption by companies of all sizes. With functionalities increasingly advanced and also
complex, IT was also getting deeper into the enterprise, touching critical functions of the
firm and impacting its organization and mode of functioning. As IT was penetrating
deeper in the enterprise, it was also being planned, designed, implemented, and serviced
by teams of specialists increasingly incorporating business skills in addition to IT skills.
2.1.2. Growth of IT as a business
It was not until the early 1980s that IT was regarded as a strategic asset. One could then
read articles in Harvard Business Review on how to improve and generate new revenue
streams rather than manage IT as a mere source of costs (Porter 1985). IT was
increasingly regarded as a source of strategic advantages enabling opportunities for
enhanced efficiencies and performance and linkages among the diverse operations of the
firm.
With the cost of microcomputers falling to commodity levels, it was natural to leverage
computers' cheap processing power in order to replace costly mainframe systems. Client-
server distributed architectures of the late 1980s to the mid-1990s were a low-cost
flexible response to the centralized mainframe architecture. Although a priori
significantly less expensive than the latter, the client-server architecture's distributed
nature was also inducing much complexity and thus significant integration and on-going
maintenance costs. In particular, integration of client-server architectures into mainframe
architectures was especially challenging.
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Figure 2-1 De-verticalization of the industry and formation of the IT value chain
2.1.3. Explosion of IT services
The advent of PCs coincided with the first wave of growth in the IT consulting industry
(Nolan 2004). The same period corresponded to what was considered as the client-server
era in the industry (see, for instance, analyst reports from BT Alex. Brown, January 1999).
But it is only from the 1990s on that IT services became a major source of growth and
profits (Nolan 2004), to the point that by the mid-90s, the industry was facing a shortage
of skilled IT labor (in 1995, analyst firms such as BT Alex. Brown were warning
investors about the primary business risk of computing and IT services companies facing
the challenge of recruiting, training, and retaining skilled technology professionals).
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The IT services industry understood the complexity their customers had to deal with in a
constantly evolving and increasingly modular technology environment. With the success
of large, customized, and often proprietary implementation projects of enterprise resource
planning (ERP), customer relationship management (CRM), and supply chain
management (SCM) systems developed by enterprise software vendors (McKinsey
Quarterly, 2003, Number 2), system integrator firms such as Accenture or Cap Gemini
grew significantly in importance in the value chain. These systems were capital-intensive
and their implementation proprietary, thus locking in customers and constraining their
users to buy from their integrator a wide range of IT services - from integration to
maintenance to training. Investments in such systems were all the more important since
they were touching core functions of the firm and it was not uncommon to observe
contracts in the range of several million dollars. And this is not even to mention that there
was little or no guarantee of business benefits.
The growth and profitability of the IT services industry attracted other participants from
within the IT value chain. Software vendors, in particular, had competencies that could be
leveraged in the IT services industry and could take advantage of the growth and
profitability of this industry. Some products firms tried to make inroads into IT
consulting through acquisitions (Nolan 2002).
The 1990s were also marked by the growth of outsourcing of IT, and then by the mid-
1990s, of business processes supported by IT such as human resources or logistics (Kiely
1996). The "make vs. buy" analysis originally developed for manufacturers, was
20
migrating from the industrial economy to the knowledge economy. With IT becoming an
increasingly complicated and costly asset of the firm associated with ballooning overhead,
many companies took the step of calling in firms specializing in the management of such
assets. Rationales typically invoked for these transactions have included the focus on core
businesses, flexibility, and what were believed to be cost advantages (Currie 2000;
Levina 1999; Lacity and Willcocks 1998).
The logic of growth of the outsourcing, IT integration, and custom programming services
sectors has been exacerbated in low-income countries where labor is comparatively
cheaper (labor costs in India after 2000 were 40% to 50% of US standards; Kumar 2005)
and the supply of qualified worker can sustain the growth of the practice. Indeed, India
and Pakistan showed the strongest pattern of information trade (Karmarkar 2004). Firms
such as Wipro, Tata Consulting, Satyam, and Infosys have all shown explosive growth
patterns. The example of Infosys (Kuemmerle 2003) illustrates well the trajectories
followed by Indian services firms. Starting from low value-added services and leveraging
their cost advantages by proposing competitive prices, these firms have since expanded
from their original undifferentiated low value-added niche markets to more profitable
markets enabling higher growth rates. Factors such as economic liberalization since the
mid- 1 980s of economies opening to the global economy, the increased acceptance of
English as the global language of business, the digitization of business processes, the
telecommunication liberalization accompanied by the drop in the average communication
price, and the skills shortage in developing countries drove the growth in IT-enabled
services in certain developing countries (Kennedy and Lewis 2002).
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2.1.4. The new logic of network economies
In the mid- 990s, the rapid take-off and exponential growth of the Internet caught the
attention of IT professionals who were quick to introduce a new concept and coin a new
word for it - "e-business". Becoming a popular technology, the Internet enabled effective
communication within the company (through an "intranet") and with the different
stakeholders of the business environment (through an "extranet") - customers, partners,
suppliers, etc... As the Internet was expanding exponentially, so too, it was expected,
would be the demand for integration services.
Over-abundant capital and a willingness to fund ever younger ventures (Jovanovic and
Rousseau 2001) lead to a fall in the average age of technology firms. The rise of small,
vertically-focused firms impacted the structure of the IT services industry. IT services
start-ups mushroomed with all sorts of Internet-related offerings - called e-business or
interactive integration services. The delivery of such offerings required skills that were
not part of the average skill set of the largest IT services companies. This enabled start-up
companies such as Razorfish or Agency.com to thrive on such businesses. Providing
skills beyond the traditional tactical consulting and software development and integration
to include strategic consulting, interactive marketing, and brand management, these start-
ups addressed niche markets and enjoyed explosive growth. Though the largest accounts
were still the preserve of large firms, the small firms taken all together were forming a
major force in IT consulting (Nolan 2002).
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The new opportunities offered by the Internet were also being captured by firms of more
consequential sizes, through acquisitions. Firms fueling their growth with acquisitions
typically targeted extension in services offerings and geographic coverage. A sample of
the type of acquisitions that were commonly observed by the late 1990s is presented in
Table. 2-1. Several vendors were then pursuing aggressive acquisition strategies. For
instance, for the period going from 1996 to 1998, Thomson SDC Platinum lists more than
30 acquisitions made by USWeb, a San Francisco-based company that offered e-
commerce services such as web site design, e-commerce system implementation, and site
administration. In order to stay competitive with giants such as CSC (Computer Science
Corporation), USWeb merged into another IT consulting firm's operations in 2000, to
form marchFIRST.
Table 2-1 Sample of acquisitions in the IT services industry - March 1998-September 1998:
acquisition of cross-industry skill set
Vendor Acquisition Date Objective
CSC Onward Apr-98 Acquired presence in ecommerce
Technologies integration services
Platinum Vivid May-98 Acquired front-end designer to marry with
Software Studios e-commerce software services
Renaissance Worldwide Mar-98 Delivers presence in interactive integration
Neoglyphics for IT services vendor
Sapient Studio Aug-98 Provides front-end design capabilities to
Archetype Sapient's back-end solutions
Think New InterWeb Jun-98 Acquired IP-based applications developer
Ideas Inc.
US Digital Jun-98 Expands back-end technical capabilities
Interactive Evolution
US Web CKS Group Sep-98 US Web's back-end combined with CKS'
front-end skills deliver leading services
portfolio offering
(source: BT Alex. Brown)
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2.1.5. The post-bubble trauma and new models of businesses
Between the end of 2000 and during 2001, companies such as marchFIRST, encountered
what was commonly referred as "the post-bubble trauma," characterized by
reorganizations, downsizing, and eventually filing of Chapter 11 with an option for
Chapter 7 (i.e., bankruptcy and liquidation filings). Many of the larger companies
observed flattening and even shrinking revenues in the years after 2000. Giants such as
Electronic Data Systems and American Management Systems which were accustomed to
double-digit growth rates of their total sales and had not reported a negative growth for
more than 25 years faced this situation in 2002, 2003, and 2004.
A direct consequence of the internet bubble collapsing and revenues declining was the
focus on cost and ROI. The discretionary nature of IT spending translated into a direct
effect of the economic downturn on IT services revenues (Kobelsy, Richardson, Zmud
2003). Consequently, business models were adapted and the largest firms went from
marketing and selling highly customized best-of-breed solutions to standardized solutions
fitting better with the cost takeout trend. Non-discretionary IT spending such as
outsourcing enabled the IT services industry to maintain certain levels of revenues and
favored firms proposing such services relatively to their competitive environment. In
particular, business process outsourcing (BPO) has grown at significant rates as
companies have been outsourcing back-office functions.
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Overall, the IT services business landscape as it is today is led by large global firms
offering end-to-end services with deep vertical expertise, international delivery models,
and a clientele made of large firms - Accenture and IBM Global Services being the
archetypes of this model. The increasing demand for focused services such as single
processes outsourcing motivated by tightened budgets also enables smaller vendors to
become more competitive in spite of their limited offerings. This industry mix is
completed by the rise of low-cost offshore firms providing services of high quality at low
cost and moving up the value-added services - Wipro, Tata, Satyam, and Infosys
representing this new trend.
2.2. Conclusion: drivers of IT services demand and value
Looking at the historical trends and issues and the repetitive logic of this industry, we
shall conclude with a few points. Demand has historically been driven by three key trends:
- Technology
o One of the characteristics of technology-driven markets is their relatively
short product life-cycle (Meixell and Wu 1998). The shortening product
life-cycle of technology increased the perishability of knowledge.
o Increasing complexity and the nested nature of technological components
have required high levels of expertise.
o New platforms and applications have cyclically motivated the need for
outside expertise.
- Market dynamics
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o Economic cycles have motivated or discouraged firms from spending on
IT - thus making IT services somewhat dependent on the dynamics of the
economy
o Information technology enabled globalization of the marketplace and
induced new trends of off-site work and in particular, of off-shoring
o Outsourcing has been increasingly accepted as a common business
practice
- Businesses' evolving needs
o New technologies and market dynamics such as outsourcing have enabled
new ways of running businesses. Redesigning business processes has
become an important factor of companies' needs.
o Businesses have increasingly asked for solutions to fit their business in
order to derive strategic value from it (e.g., cost advantages, new revenue
potential).
o Needs have balanced from focus on costs to focus on strategic advantages,
depending on the economic conditions
Value has been driven by the needs of the customers. These needs have been associated
with resources ranging from "hard assets," such as equipment and infrastructure, to
immaterial but highly strategic resources such as processes. At one end of the spectrum
of the different types of asset, hard assets are commodities which one can manufacture,
buy, observe, reverse-engineer, and copy; these assets provide little strategic advantage.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are extremely "soft" assets which are difficult to
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quantify, qualify, appreciate, and (a fortiori) copy. Such assets are built in the
organization of a firm. They are intrinsic to the firm. Made of the web of formal and
informal relations between the firm's employees and also with external stakeholders, and
the knowledge shared under more or less tacit forms between employees of the firm,
these assets are difficult to acquire or copy. The value of services provided by an IT
services firm typically increases with the immateriality of the client's goods the service
firm is working with, leading to a hierarchy among the different types of services. This
viewpoint has its importance in understanding the dynamics of the IT services market, as
one could predict for instance the disruption of the industry by IT services players
moving up the ladder of value-added services, starting with undifferentiated low value-
added commodity-like services and leveraging cost advantages, and then growing and
capturing market shares in higher value-added services markets - Indian IT services and
software firms seem ready to follow this path to disruption.
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CHAPTER 3 From the General Characteristics of Services to the
Specificities of IT Services
Service businesses are people businesses. While selling a product is selling the result of
an automated process conceived in advance, selling services is equivalent to "renting"
people - those then being called "consultants." The cost of such activity is a priori
necessarily much higher than that of selling an automated product. Not only are people
much more expensive by the hour and more complex to manage and organize than
(manufacturing) machines, what they do is also much more difficult to measure. In other
words, services operations have their own challenges and characteristics that product
operations don't have (or don't have to the same extent). In order to understand what the
drivers of performance of services firms are, it is important to first understand the core
characteristics of services offerings.
However, although differences between goods and services have been recognized for a
long time, literature on services is much scarcer than that on products. We shall consider
the definition of services and their characteristics. We shall discuss how these
characteristics impact the functioning and strategies of IT services firms. Additionally,
we shall look more specifically at the characteristics peculiar to professional services.
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3.1. The essence of IT services
3.1.1. Fundamental properties that distinguish services operations from products
operations
Services are usually defined in contrast with products, leading to more or less fuzzy
boundaries between the two (Parrinello 2004; Bowen and Ford 2002). Gilmore (2003),
for instance, defines a service organization as one for which "the perceived value of the
offering to the buyer is determined more by the service rendered than the product
offered" (p. 4). It can be added that while a service organization can provide an almost
entirely intangible offering, it can also sell products. For instance, a retail store is a
service organization selling products. Services can fit into the continuity of products
offerings in the form of after-sale services. However, services have features that
fundamentally distinguish them from products. A series of these features have been
proposed by scholars studying services industries (Andreasen and Kotler 2003, Bitran
and Lojo 1993). Below is a list of core features and their descriptions (see Table 3-1)
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Table 3-1 The fundamental characteristics of services
Characteristic Description
Intangibility The value transferred to the customer does not have a physical
form, especially once the service has been consumed - although
it may have some sort of physical representation (e.g., a billing
statement).
Inseparability of The service is inseparable from the source that supplies it. For
production and instance, it is not possible to be treated by a dentist if the dentist
consumption does not see you.
Perishability The service or any part of it cannot be "stored" or conserved in
any ways. In other words, services can't be produced in advance.
There is necessarily simultaneity in the production and
consumption of services.
Heterogeneity Each service encounter is different. Services are characterized by
a significant variance in their characteristics (those valued by the
customer being designated under the term "quality") over time
and between the clients. It is thus difficult to standardize
offerings or have a constant quality level.
Transferability Many of the characteristics of services offerings can be
compared across sectors. This is typically not the case with a
product - it is possible to buy a new car and an apple, but not to
compare them in ways that would affect a next purchasing
decision. Service customers may transfer their expectations
across sectors.
Cultural The service encounter may be affected (usually negatively) by
specificity the difference of culture of the provider and customer. As a
consequence, many offshore firms train their client service
representatives in order to eliminate local accents and become
familiar with customer colloquialisms. In the same vein, a
common practice is to have client service representatives in
developing countries adopt American personae when answering
requests from American customers (Kennedy and Lewis 2002) -
e.g., Ajit from Bombay becomes A.J. from Boston.
The most fundamental characteristic of services, intangibility, implies that the outcome of
the purchase of a service cannot be known and judged in advance. Additionally, because
the outcome of services is generally impossible to reverse, benefits have to be described
in advance. The role of sales is paramount under such conditions. One of the reasons why
a customer cannot foresee the outcome, and possibly not even understand the value of the
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offering, is generally that she does not have the knowledge and skills related to the
service she needs (Connor and Davidson 1985). Although a customer might understand
the need for a service, there is a large amount of uncertainty associated with its purchase.
Because intangibility increases the degree of uncertainty and the need for tangibility
(through explanations and sales efforts), an alternate strategy that would trigger service
events would be to sell products and, separately, services associated with the products.
The product will call naturally for services such as deployment, maintenance, upgrade, or
integration. A product can also require significantly less marketing efforts.
Intangibility of services also brings hurdles to the direct "measurement" of the different
characteristics of the service provided (Bitran and Lojo 1993). The service-product does
not include any "pre-test." There are two consequences to this characteristic. First, it is
likely that the buying decision process of potential customers will be based to a
significant extent on the reputation of the firm, and on referrals. In that regard, it is not
uncommon to see smaller firms disclose the names of some of their most prestigious
clients or at least the number or size of their clients in an attempt to build reputation by
exposing credentials - even large and well known firms won't miss the opportunity to
boast that their clients are among top tier firms of the industry (e.g, Accenture mentions
in its annual reports that most of its clients are part of Global 500 and Fortune 1000
rankings). Marketing costs thus play a significant role in establishing the reputation of a
services firm. Second, as mentioned earlier, benefits have to be described in advance.
The role of sales is paramount under such conditions.
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A service cannot be experienced without the commitment of resources from its supplier
because consumption and production are simultaneous. There is inseparability of
production and consumption. The provision of services typically requires the physical
presence of representatives of the service firm (Kotler 1984). Progress in information and
telecommunication technologies has relaxed this necessity by creating more flexible
customer interfaces (e.g., email, video-conferencing). Yet while some services can be
provided from distant locations, the act of providing the service requires the supplier to
have labor resources allocated for the period of the consumption of the service.
Furthermore, because the physical presence of a consultant can be considered as a quality
gauge, most consulting firms have sent their consultants to be at the customer's site. The
role of simultaneity is also a key differentiator of services products when compared to
products. Indeed, while the feed-back from the customer cannot be obtained before the
final delivery of a product, the consumer of a service can directly impact production of
the service itself. As a result, the quality of a service will be a function of the customer's
ability to describe what he or she wants (Jackson, Neidel, and Lunsford 1995).
The fact that services are perishable virtually eliminates the notion of inventories by
making impossible the accumulation of the production of services. Anticipating future
demand and developing a cost-efficient model of operations flexible enough to absorb
demand fluctuations is critical to the success of service businesses. Another consequence
is the importance of long-term relationships with clients, which can lead to more stable
workload; additionally, long-term relationships, because they relate to customer
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satisfaction and thus referrals, are likely to reduce marketing costs (Brentani and Ragot
1996).
Heterogeneity of the services is at the root of the need for quality control and a major
hurdle to growth. There is heterogeneity for the simple reason that people differ in their
personalities, skills, knowledge, and ability to communicate (Morgan 1991).
Standardization is thus made impossible for services. Controlling heterogeneity requires
measures of performance and quality. Filtering applicants at the recruitment and training
of the staff is key in order to manage heterogeneity of the service encounters.
Transferability increases competitive pressure by decreasing the differentiation potential
of each firm. Services firms have typically tried to hedge against transferability by
developing a corporate culture and specific methodologies and by developing offerings
tailored on vertical markets. Transferability may play a key role in the dynamics in which
hardware, software, and pure IT services vendors with local, global, or off-shore models
compete on service offerings.
On the basis of this discussion and the framework presented by Morgan (1991), we
propose a framework of strategies specific to services firms in the table below (Table 3-2).
This framework will help us understand different dynamics possibly observed in our
analysis.
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Characteristic Strategy options Tactical elements
Intangibility More tangible Add products to the offering - e.g., develop a
business model with a products component
Describe the benefits rather than the features of
the services
Less tangible Develop the firm's image and identity
Invest in branding efforts
Inseparability of Increase separation Off-site service provision
production and Geographic location (off-shore)
consumption Front-office/operations split
Decrease separation On-site service provision
Geographic location (on-shore)
Staff placement with client
Perishability Manage demand Limit client base
Practice differential fee schedules in order to
manage seasonal peaks of demand
Cultivate non-peak demand
Manage supply Yield management (sell over-capacity "at
cost")
Employ part-time workers
Sub-contract
Manage partner accessibility
Increase client's participation
Office hours and days
Heterogeneity Service Technical quality assurance
standardization Develop methodologies
Make reusable "tools"
Use a product component
Technology System and administration quality
utilization Technical service excellence
Recruitment and Service quality monitoring
training
Transferability More transferable Propose service offerings overlapping
competitors' offerings
Less transferable Develop highly specific offerings
Develop intellectual property and capital
Cultural More cultural Recruit within the target cultural environment
specificity specificity Train (colloquialisms, jargon, culture)
Geographic localization close to the customer
Less cultural Develop a corporate identity across cultural
specificity boundaries
Educate the customer
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From a broader perspective, these issues mostly fall under the category of incomplete or
asymmetric information. These problems are generally classified into either moral hazard
or adverse selection. There is moral hazard in that the buyer is unable to observe (all) the
actions taken by the seller. Intangibility and its consequences - especially heterogeneity,
and the difficulty in judging the service before experiencing it (and even once having
experienced it) - makes the evaluation of the services rendered difficult. In particular, it is
often hard to answer with certitude questions such as: "Did the consultants help us?"
"Did the consultant do what was reasonable to do?" There is adverse selection in that it is
usually difficult for the buyer to observe either the seller's characteristics or assess the
situation itself. As a consequence, clients are usually uncertain about questions such as:
"Did my company really need all those expensive services?" As shown by Akerlof
(1970), under such situations, buyers face significant hurdles to evaluating the value of
the services provided. Lower-quality services providers can enter the market with price-
competitive offerings. Hence, high prices should signal high quality. However, because
of adverse selection, low-quality services providers could also charge high prices.
Building reputation and trust seems to be the most adequate solution to these problems
(Nayyam 1990). In particular, strategies based on partnership networks enabling referrals
are key drivers of success in service businesses (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindsquist,
and Borgatti 1998; Connor and Davidson 1985; Kotler 1984). Publications and public
relations (Marcus 1992; Connor and Davidson 1985), or more generally, word-of-mouth
(Rogerson 1983) also have an important impact on the success of services firms.
Additionally, it is also argued that high quality firms should retain and attract more
customers and become larger at equilibrium (Rogerson 1983). Thus the sheer size of the
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firm plays a role both in signaling quality of the services and in gaining visibility.
Nonetheless, there are also opportunities for smaller firms.
3.1.2. A closer look: the specificities of business-to-business professional services
Despite the growing importance in the economy of business-to-business professional
services, the literature on the subject is meager. Very little has been undertaken in order
to understand the IT services industry. The literature on professional services is most
often focused on health care and legal services. We shall review what has been
accomplished in that field and consider the components that apply to business-to-business
professional services.
From a customer perspective the key need driving demand and thus shaping professional
services is uncertainty (Morgan 1991). Due to the very raison d'etre of professional
services - which is essentially to provide the customer with skills and resources she does
not have at the same efficiency levels -- the primary need of customers is to minimize
uncertainty around knowledge, technical expertise, and experience she does not possess.
Professional services are defined as the services rendered by "firms [that] sell industrial
services that involve highly specialized skills and are of an advisory nature" (Bentani and
Ragot 1996). These firms supplement clients lacking the required specialized resources to
respond to the demand of the market or to competitive pressure. Although uncertainty is a
driver of demand, it is also a hurdle to it. Paradoxically, firms requiring external expertise
don't always know what expertise they need - "it takes perspective to know that you
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need perspective" (Marcus 1992, p. 305). It happens that the consultant himself or herself
does not know what is best for the client. Thus, identifying the client's problems involves
judgment exercised under conditions of uncertainty - given that the client would not ask
for the services of a consultant under conditions of certainty (Watson, Rodgers, and
Dudek 1998).
From the service supplier's perspective, business-to-business services markets differ from
customer services markets on a certain number of points (Filiatrault and Lapierre 1997):
- customers are larger, fewer, and often geographically concentrated
- demand is fluctuating and relatively inelastic
- the number of stakeholders in the buying process is much more important
- the buying process and the process of delivering the services involve a closer
relationship
- technology products play an important role
We might add that the psychology of the purchaser is very different. For instance, pricing
tactics based on consumer behaviors generally don't apply to the field of organizational
buyers.
Furthermore, and one might consider this as the most important point in describing
professional services: it's a people business. The producers are also those who are the
leaders and the owners of the business. There is a fundamental consequence to this.
Contrary to the retail business, for instance, where the strategy would shape the buying,
channels, and marketing capabilities, the professional services firm's strategy is
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determined by its organization, skills, and experiences (Jacobs 2003). Thomas J. Tierney,
former CEO of Bain & Company, gives a clear description of the situation: "[Altering a
professional services firm's strategy] is far more difficult than changing the design of a
product or distribution system. In this case, you're talking about changing people --
people who often hold an interest in the firm as its partners."2 If we extend this logic to
the whole organization and the more junior staff, other dynamics may appear. One of
extreme importance is the management of growth and human resources. Because (usually)
the more senior the professional, the more difficult to find, one observes a limit to growth
above which the organization might experience a dilution of skills with an organizational
diagram heavily weighted toward its lower end.
Besides, other factors might make profitable staff growth rate relatively inelastic. Webb
(1982) proposes that "staff cannot be drastically cut back without negative effect on
future recruiting efforts," which translates into increases in future recruiting costs. He
also states that staffing increase above a certain point will result in lower profitability (per
employee), which view is compatible with the proposition that a dilution of skills might
occur above a certain growth rate. With the notion of recruiting comes the notion of
turnover. A professional firm's employee represents skills, experience, and costs related
to training and recruiting. If the latter costs are sunk, they are still incurred when a
professional leaves the firm and is replaced by another one. Schlesinger and Heskett
(1991) propose that in a services business, employee turnover and customer satisfaction
are negatively related and that quality of the service is positively related to the skills of
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2 In Jacobs (2003).
the employees. Thus, in a situation where the growth rate of the firm would be so high
that it would require the firm to loosen its recruiting standards and hire less qualified
employees, a consequence would likely be an increase over time in employee turnover. In
any case, and more generally (if the reason stated above is probable; we acknowledge
that other forces factor into this equation), one might observe an increase in the cost of
growth with growth itself.
3.2. Different models of IT services businesses
3.2.1. The foundation of IT services business models: services offerings
The raison d'8tre of IT services is related to the nature of the firm and of the way
technology evolves. Consequently, IT services firms have continually expanded their
skill sets in order to include offerings corresponding to new technologies, all the while
permeating through increasingly deeper and strategic functions of the firm. In the space
of offerings, positioning of large IT services providers is generally followed by small and
medium firms in this market after a certain lapse of time (Currie 2000). By inspecting the
offerings of the largest players as well as those of smaller players3 over the period from
1990 to 2004, we found that although no two firms provided the same set of services,
virtually any IT services firm focused on some or all of the following core skills:
- IT and business consulting
- IT and business process outsourcing
- System integration
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- Application development
- Training
- Staffing
- Maintenance and technical support
Each type of service has its own specificities beyond the fact that they require specific
skills. As such, they define specific markets that have specific demand levels and growth
rates. Another way of ranking these offerings is by order ofprofitability - for instance,
strategic consulting (also known as "high value consulting") has been followed by system
integration, facilities management, and application development. It is also possible to
differentiate these offerings by characterizing them according to their relationships with
the customers induced by these services. For instance, different services would allow
building relationships at different levels of the client company. While IT-focused and
implementation services would typically deal with the IT services of a company, strategic
management services would permit developing ties with the executive management of
the client's firm. Relationships might also have typical durations. At one end of the
spectrum, outsourcing is typically dealt with on an on-going basis and usually lasts
anywhere between one and ten years. At the other end, IT services firms might provide
training on a more opportunistic basis. In between, there are all sorts of project-based
contracts - IT and business consulting, system integration, and application development.
3We considered: Accenture, EDS, Scient, Viant, Bearingpoint, Unisys, Equant, CSK, Diamondcluster,
Digitas, The Thomas Group, Exponent, Keane, Perot, Analysts International, and Wipro.
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Service offerings have also seen an overall trend toward increasing customization, with
offerings being tailored to specific verticals in the 90s and then to business functions in
the late 90s and early 2000s. Such differentiation strategies have been favored by smaller
consulting firms, most often focusing on a vertical, trying to carve out their share of the
market by addressing niches, but it has also been adopted by larger firms which started to
have increasingly complex organizational structures built around "verticals" servicing
specific industries and "business horizontals" providing services corresponding to
specific business functions across industries (see Fig. 3-1).
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3.2.2. The different types of business models
The IT services industry was not so much defined by the existing offerings as by the
types of players it was made of. One way to categorize these companies is to segment
them by type of activity. Moore (2005) contrasts business models that typically
correspond to those of large integrator firms, with business models of large enterprise
software firms. However, it is clear that such a dichotomy is far from capturing all the
subtleties of products and services business models. Indeed, a consequential shift has
been observed toward services from products vendors (Cusumano 2004).
Another view is proposed by Nolan and Bennigson (2002), who classify IT services
players according to six paradigms:
- System integrators: with powerhouses such as Accenture,
PriceWaterhouseCooper/IBM Global Services. These vendors tend to address
large projects and charge premium prices by leveraging their scale.
- Web design firms: smaller firms with a technical focus and barely differentiated
from each other.
- Interactive agencies: firms such as Razorfish or Agency.com focused on
marketing services and proposed web-design as a natural extension of their core
competencies.
- Management consultants: With top tier clients and strong brand equity, firms such
as McKinsey and the Boston Consulting Group expanded from pure strategy to
more technology-related offerings such as web strategy.
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- Pure e-Business Players: Start-up firms such as Scient entered the market without
any expertise or methodologies. Garnering diverse talents in strategy,
development, and creative design under one roof, these firms were trying to
capture their share of the IT services market. Most of these firms disappeared.
- Application Service Providers (ASPs): ASPs propose a particular model of
application integration where the client is charged for installation fees, and then
on a monthly basis. This idea of software rental has been applied by SAP, Oracle,
and PeopleSoft.
3.3. Conclusion
Business operations for services are radically different from operations for manufactured
goods. For services firms, intangibility, simultaneity, perishability, heterogeneity,
transferability, and cultural specificity govern the behavior of the firm, its interface with
the customer, and the customer's behavior. Because of these specificities, selling and
buying services requires methods that are specific to the business of services.
Growth of IT services firms is subject to both positive feed-back phenomena and
balancing phenomena. While reputation adds to size, which improves reputation through
diverse mechanisms (e.g., word-of-mouth, network of partner companies and referrals),
growth is moderated by inefficiencies in the recruitment process. Besides, a large firm is
also subject to inflexibility, as noted by Tierney (see Jacobs 2003).
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On top of that, IT services firms have their own complexity, with a complex matrix
structure for the larger organizations. Although smaller firms can leverage the difficulty
for larger firms to adapt to a high degree to specific verticals or horizontals, few have
really been successful. The 'Pure eBusiness Players' of Nolan and Bennigson's
categories (2002) prove that talent alone is meaningless to the business of consulting and
IT services. Brand equity, customer base, and intellectual capital are core determinants of
success.
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CHAPTER 4 Products and Services Business Models
As we will see in the next section, services are mostly defined by contrast with products.
Besides, as analyzed in Chapter 2, IT services have proved to be fundamentally
dependent on the business of IT products. An integral part of the business of IT and
subsequently of IT services, it is worth focusing on the IT products business and
understanding how products can fit into the strategy of services firms and vice versa. We
shall first consider in what sense products are different from services and require specific
strategies, and then discuss how products and services can interact.
4.1. How products and services strategies differ
Large products firms are generally highly specialized and focus their efforts on more or
less narrow domains of expertise corresponding to specific technology components. For
instance, Intel focuses on the chip industry, Microsoft targets operating system and
productivity software markets, and Oracle has historically been focusing on database
software. Few companies have opted for an integrative approach, and none have emerged
as leader or stayed in such positions - e.g., IBM initially sold its mainframes bundled
with software and services but was not able to maintain such a way of conducting its
business, Apple originally captured market share with its integrated personal computer
systems, but soon had to leave most of it to its modular competitors, etc...
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If economies of scale would first come to mind when thinking about products market
leaders such as Intel, it might not be the only explanation (Iansiti and Levien 2002).
Indeed, fabless business models adopted by firms such as Broadcom enabled them to
thrive without manufacturing operations from which Intel derives economies of scale.
One important driver of the dynamics of technology product industries is the importance
of the notion of "standard" as shown by Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom (1991)
with the case of the VCR industry. Cusumano and Gawer (2001, 2002) pushed this
analysis further and explained the strategic role of platforms and complements in
achieving industry leadership. Fundamentally, firms are not simply acting in a linear
chain of value. Rather, they interact with a whole ecosystem of firms which can turn out
to be complementors or competitors depending on the strategy adopted. Innovation is not
only the fruit of the platform leader, but also of its complementors. Attracting and
enabling firms so that they can participate in innovating, marketing, and selling products
complementary around a wannabe platform is a key driver of the success of a technology
firm (Cusumano 2004; Gawer et al. 2002; Cusumano et al. 2001). Christensen and his
collaborators propose a viewpoint which, although different from the viewpoint
expressed by Cusumano et al., is also based on the idea of industrial networks. In
Christensen's theory, firms are to some extent prisoners of the value networks - that is,
"the context within which a firm identifies and responds to customer's needs, solves
problems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit" 4 - within which
they operate, and can be victims of a technology or market disruption led by firms
developing their own value network (Christensen 2003; Christensen 1997; Christensen
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4 From Christensen (1997, p. 32).
and Rosenbloom 1995). In an industry driven by positive feedback effects such as those
generated by network externalities we have explored, the firm that manages to leverage
best these effects eventually comes out as a sole winner. Also, in such industries, scholars
agree that technology superiority is not a gauge of success. Still, a capability focus is
important - not only to develop a product that satisfies customers, but mostly in order to
manage the market forces that determine leadership.
While technology products companies most often extract market power from their
installed base, a "pure" services firm (e.g., management consulting, IT services) derives
significant market power from a large client base for reasons observed in Chapter 3 -
which does not mean that a small services firm cannot thrive. It is also important to note
that while products firms put high stakes on a few technologies (which is also the best
strategy, as suggested above), and are thus permanently exposed to the risk of making
losing bids, pure services firms are not subject to the same extent to such bets. In fact, it
is even possible to argue from the analysis in Chapter 2 that IT services firms thrive on
technological changes, which are also the most uncertain times for products firms, subject
to business models and technological disruptions from new entrants (Utterback and
SuArez 1993; Christensen 2003, 1997).
At the industry level, other dimensions account for the different dynamics of products
and services businesses. With the trend of globalization, the most pregnant issue
concerning both of them is the dynamics of commoditization of the IT industry (Carr
2003). While commoditization directly concerns products vendors, it also concerns
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services providers as the business of services becomes increasingly global and firms
leverage specific factor conditions (e.g., qualified and relatively inexpensive labor of
developing countries).
The mode of consumption of products and services can profoundly impact the variability
of cash flows. In particular, discretionary spending is typically cut during economic
downturns. Revenues derived from such budgets subject most product sales and also
project-based consulting to unanticipated sharp decreases. However, there are a number
of IT services that are mostly immune to these spending attritions. Outsourcing and
maintenance are typically the two most resilient services in down economies because of
focusing on costs or on functions that are most often necessary to the functioning of the
client's operations.
4.2. How products and services interact
4.2.1. Services and products business models
Although services and products operations are radically different and require
fundamentally different business approaches, the two share ties that affect business
dynamics at firm and industry levels. However, literature is scarce on that subject and has
mostly focused on a product perspective. Lifecycle models that have been proposed by
scholars are essentially based on a product-process paradigm (see for instance Utterback
and Suirez 1993; Utterback 1994). Recent research efforts show that this analysis is only
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partly valid. Cusumano, Kahl, and Sudrez (2006) suggest that models of industry
lifecycle have largely overlooked the role of services. By analyzing business models of
firms in software and services industries, Cusumano et al. found that a significant source
of profits and revenues can be extracted from a third business cycle induced by services,
and they propose that life cycle models follow a product-process-services paradigm (Fig.
4-1). In that regard, it is interesting to consider the relative importance of products and
services in IT businesses.
Focus of
Attention &
Revenues
, roauct Innovation Process InnovationProcess Innovaton
Time
Figure 4-1 Product-Process-Services paradigm
(Source: Cusumano et al. 2006)
Cusumano (2003, 2004) proposes two types of business models dubbed products and
services business models, respectively corresponding to products and services firms.
Products firms are characterized by revenue streams essentially derived from the sales of
products such as software licenses or hardware, while services firms essentially derive
revenue from the sale of services ranging from installation and maintenance, to training,
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to integration work. A third category called hybrid corresponds to firms mixing services
and products revenues.
Business models based on products and services differ widely on several points
(Cusumano 2003, 2004). First, the patterns of cash flow over time generated by the two
models are radically different. Product revenues are essentially generated at the time of
the sale while service revenues are spread over time - e.g., software licenses are sold
under a one-time transaction, while outsourcing engagements are billed over time under
contracts that can often be interrupted any time after the beginning of the engagement. As
a matter of fact, under the general principle accounting rules firms recognize immediately
their products and recognize long-term services sales on a per-period basis, as the service
is performed and gradually paid. Second, gross margins associated with products are
expected to be much higher than those associated with services - e.g., the cost of
production of a "shrink-wrapped" program (the cost of manufacturing and packaging a
CD-ROM) is likely to be negligible when compared to the price of the offering, while the
operating expenses of a consultancy activity are driven by the number of employees
associated with this activity, typically ranging from 50% to 70% for large US-based IT
and management services firms. Besides, product companies likely record significant
marketing, support, and services expenses. Third, standardization is most likely what a
products firm will pursue, in order to derive economies of scale, while customization is a
core part of the value proposition of services firms. A corollary of the two previous points
is that products firms are typically going after volume sales (e.g., Microsoft addresses
mass markets), while services firms will try to capture large contract at once (e.g.,
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Accenture targets Fortune 1000 firms). Fourth, service operations are characterized by
their labor-intensity, which directly relate to the top line of such firms. In terms of head
count, products firms would most likely want just enough employees to develop their
products. In particular, while an addition of employees in a service firm translates into an
increase of revenues, the same does not hold true for product firms.
The corollary to these attributes is that a products firm will organize itself in order to
deliver a "hit" that would attract as many customers as possible. In such a firm, R&D is
critical for the development of a product, which has to be better than that of its
competitors in order to capture a large enough share of the market to make the business
profitable. In contrast, the scalability of the sales of a services firm is constrained by the
firm's head count. Thus, customer profitability, cost of services, and utilization of the
employees (i.e., the ratio of the amount of time during which a consultant is working for
a client to the amount of time she is not working for a client) is critical to the success of
such firms. Because of their necessary case-by-case and labor-intensive approach,
services sales can be an impediment to growth. In that sense, scaling up sales is a much
trickier goal for services firms than it is for products firms.
These very differences between models associated with the sales of products and services
motivate consideration of business models as key factors in the performance of computer
services firms, who might complement their services revenues with the sales of products,
thus getting closer to a product business model associated with higher margins.
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4.2.2. Services sales as a result of product sales
Although services businesses can be conducted as standalone businesses - that is, without
necessarily associating the sales of services with a specific product, most products
businesses induce after-sale services. Those services can be provided by the products
vendor or by an independent service vendor. Indeed, as noted by Cusumano (2004), of
the total sales derived from an enterprise software product, a firm can generate between
15% and 20% of its revenues in maintenance fees, and up to a dollar of software services
for every dollar in software license fees, for the first few years of the contract.
Delivering services requires specific competencies and assets. For instance, the delivery
of integration services and maintenance services requires a network of professionals able
to move on-site in order to deliver their services - for instance, field engineers might be
sent on-site to diagnose issues the client is facing with its infrastructure or its software
system. Furthermore, if the products sold are hardware products, maintenance requires a
logistic network in order to provide the required parts to the customer or to retrieve parts
from the customer and return them to the manufacturer or a specialized repair service.
These physical requirements are attenuated with software products that can be diagnosed
at distant places through networked architecture. The delivery of after-sale services
requires specific capabilities.
In the case of after-sale services, the service sales and its life-cycle are directly related to
the product's installed base. Maintenance services such as support, upgrade, and
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troubleshooting, will be direct functions of the number of units of the product in use.
Additionally, one might expect different life-cycle schemes for different types of services.
For instance, one might expect different life-cycles for installation and integration
services and for maintenance services. Installation and integration services might occur
simultaneously with the first sales of a product, and also later on, in order to integrate
other applications with it; one might expect integration sales related to a product to
follow a life-cycle curve (e.g., the volume of sales per period) to follow somewhat
closely the one of the underlying product. Maintenance occurs in a more "diluted" way
and over a longer period of time than integration services and depends more on the
installed base than the recent sales of a product. One example that is mostly focused on
maintenance revenues is illustrated in the figure below (Fig. 4-2). It is clear according to
this life-cycle model that the sales of a product can enable subsequent service sales.
Especially in good times, when products sales are high, this model could explain the
attractiveness of selling products, even for a services firm. Indeed, the market for ERPs
was mostly based on the sales of complex products that required much integration and
maintenance work. Although system integrators in general did not have the capability to
deliver such systems, many partnered with enterprise software vendors to go-to-market
with a full solution including software and services, and even hardware components.
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Figure 4-2 Example of product and service life cycle for a computer product firm
(Source: Potts, 1988)
It is interesting to note that although service sales can be lucrative, a certain range of
services such as consulting and system integration are mostly the preserve of pure IT
services vendors (excepting IBM). There are several reasons for this. First, as seen in
Chapter 3, reputation of the firm plays a critical role in the sales of services. A firm that is
well known for its software products is not necessarily known for its services. And
indeed, it is generally considered that products firms' services are of lower quality and
have a narrower scope than those offered by pure IT services firms. Second, and this is a
consequence of the problem of information asymmetry discussed in Chapter 3, products
firms selling services are often viewed as biased in the consulting advice they propose.
Indeed, for example, if you have a problem with your car, your car dealer would be the
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last person you would ask advice from (unless the car is under warranty) - as you would
expect his or her very kind advice to be simply to buy a new car to "fix" the problem. The
same goes for enterprise software vendors. It is thus natural to view the structure of the
industry through the lens of products firm - services firms partnerships.
4.2.3. Products sales as a result of service sales
If products call for services, so too, in a less obvious but significant way, can services
generate product sales. There are essentially two means by which a service generates
products sales. A products firm can propose upgrades or cross-sell complementary
products or modules to its clients, using its services efforts in order to determine its
clients' needs; or an external service provider can sell a partner's product to its client,
thus playing the role of a channel partner. The first case is what led many enterprise
software firms to acquire IT services firms and graft them more or less successfully onto
their organizations. More generally, Cusumano et al. (2004, 2006) have observed a shift
of software products vendors toward services. Companies such as Oracle and PeopleSoft
that were collecting 70% of their revenues from products and the rest from services in
1990 had reversed the proportion in 2000, selling services at a level of 70% of their
revenues. It could be argued that products firms are now focusing on their services
operations, which they maintain by selling the software that enables a large part of their
services sales.
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Nevertheless, for the reason stated above at the end of section 4.2.2, software firms and
services firms maintain symbiotic relations. Sales from services related to the sales of
product can be derived by IT services firms. It is thus valuable for an IT services firm to
enable the sales of products (on which it can also capture channel fees). Also, many IT
services companies have taken positions and formed alliances with products firm - for
example, Accenture stated in its SEC SC 13 G filing of February 2000 a equity stake in
Siebel of 3.14%; this alliance led Accenture to have the highest share of Siebel
implementations. Such alliances enable IT services firms to sell services related to the
installed base of a given product vendor. The total value to the customer is the sum of
that provided by the product vendor and the services vendor. Insofar as the value of
services is difficult to measure and seems mostly related to brand and size effects, such
alliances make sense for both products and services vendors. Additionally, the proximity
of IT services firms to the clients enables them to develop a wealth of information on
their needs, which can be channeled back to the product vendor in an alliance.
4.3. Interactions across the value-chain
When the provider of services is different from the provider of products, a dynamic along
the value chain might be observed, with revenues and costs supported by different actors
of the chain. One of the main costs of the technology industries is the cost of innovation.
Most such costs occur around the development of a product. Such products can be
produced either by products vendors or services vendors. Products vendors likely sell
their products to derive direct benefits from them, whereas service providers might
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develop a product in order to provide services differentiated by the use of a product that
makes possible new efficiencies but which no other services provider can offer.
These two different product approaches lead to very different innovation approaches. The
first one is related to market dynamics. In this approach, limited amounts of resources are
basically bet on a technology by means of R&D investments (as well as marketing, sales,
etc...). Innovations developed by other firms can in turn either increase or undermine the
value of a firm's expertise (Henderson and Clark 1990). The second approach
corresponds more to the formation of intellectual capital in order to differentiate the firm.
Such an approach might be pursued by smaller firms whose initial assets consist mostly
of the creativity of its employees.
There is actually a third approach to innovation, which is to let others conduct it. For
instance, when Accenture takes equity stakes in Siebel, what it is doing is mostly
investing in an innovation (Siebel's software) and the installed base that comes with it.
Such an approach requires certain features of the firm. Typically, Accenture brings value
to Siebel in exchange for its partnership. Accenture's value to Siebel can be described in
terms of its reputation, large customer base, and understanding of customer needs, as well
as long-term relationships with many of its accounts. Accenture can thus help Siebel in
the development of its products, and enable its current and future sales, all the while
ensuring a high level of service quality.
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While innovation is a critical factor in products businesses, it seems that this is not so
much the case for large IT and management consulting firms - or at least, not all the time:
as we will see, R&D investments are more opportunistic in the IT services industry than
in the software products industry. For example, Accenture's R&D expenses have been
around 2% since 2000. Keane decreased its R&D expenses from about 9% of its total
sales in 1990 to less than 4% in 1998. Indian companies - which are known for their
software-intensive business - have also shown decreasing R&D expenses since 1990, and
firms such as Wipro, Satyam, and Infosys were spending no more than 10% of their
revenues on R&D in 2004. Also, it is clear that R&D efforts are most important for small
firms which have extremely high average R&D expenses as compared to their revenues
(see Fig. 4-2).
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Figure 4-3 Average R&D expenses for public IT and consulting services firmss
(SIC codes 7370, 7371, 7373, 8742 - source: Compustat)
5 Not all firm reported their R&D expenses. See Fig. 3 in appendix for the percentage of firms reporting
their R&D expenses.
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This stark difference can be explained by the difference in business models and value
networks in which large and small firms operate.6 Small firms will try to differentiate
themselves through intellectual property and the development of highly specific
applications, while large firms, connected with a large base of potential customers of
software products, are acting as channel partners of enterprise software firms. In the large
firm business model, R&D expenses are thus pushed up the value chain and left to
software application vendors. Small firms, not benefiting from the asset that a large
customer base is, most likely count on the uniqueness of their human and intellectual
capital - which is also close to being all the assets they can afford at this stage.
1
c
-
c 14
a)
12
.~ 8
.. 10
m E~.2 8(U
X 4
XE 2
0
U.'
am
0.18 E
E
0.16 ' -
0.14 X ,
a,I=
0.12 c
0.1 m E
en X
0.08 a C
0.06 , g
0.04 cm
0.02 )
0
M ) 0) 0
, Less than $133 nillion firms (left axis) b-- More than $133 million firms (right axis)
Figure 4-4 Average R&D expenses for public software firms7
(SIC codes 7372 - Source: Compustat)
Considering now the software industry (Fig. 4-4), it is interesting to note three facts:
6 We consider $133 million as a cut-offvalue between "small" and "large" firms. Reasons for this choice
are given in Chapter 5.
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- The prepackaged software industry has historically been more R&D-intensive
than the large (more than $133 million) IT services firms, but less so than small
IT services firms.
- On average, "large" software firms (with more than $133 million in net sales per
year) are investing at a steady rate, over time, of about 16% of their net sales.
- The average R&D investment as a percentage of sales of smaller software firms
(less than $133 million in net sales per year) is more subject to volatility than that
of larger software firms.
This likely indicates that large software firms are not subject to the same technological
constraints and pressures as small software firms (which can be pressured to deliver
rapidly or to deliver "better" products). Another viewpoint is that, because of externalities
(as seen before), few firms manage to develop a significant installed base and to motivate
the production of complementary products. As a consequence, what we observe could
correspond more to a desperate attempt of smaller firms to disrupt larger firms than to a
sustainable strategy. (The average R&D expense as a percentage of total sales of small
firms was close to - or more than - 100% between 1996 and 2003!)
Overall, most of the technological innovation is produced upstream, by software vendors,
while large IT services firms spend opportunistically on R&D during periods of
economic growth - R&D being used to conduct market research (Miles 2005), build
complex solutions, and capture higher value-added opportunities. During economic
downturns, IT services cut their R&D expenses and expect software firms to use their
7 Each year, more than 98% of the firms in the database reported their R&D expenses
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R&D investments in order to develop standardized, low-cost packages, on top of which
IT services firms likely derive their benefits by channeling the products to their customer
base. It is not fortuitous that Microsoft, for example, entertains the bulk of its industrial
partnerships with system integrators (see, e.g., Iansiti and Levien 2003). Hence, even
though pure services firms have large costs of services and lower gross margins than
software businesses (Cusumano, Kahl, and Su/rez 2006), they might close the gap or
even outperform software firms which bear large and seemingly incompressible R&D
costs.
4.4. Conclusion
Products and services businesses differ in many respects, from operations to financials; in
brief, they are based on different business models. Nonetheless, products and services can
be seen as complementary activities with their own life-cycles, as proposed by Cusumano
et al. (2006). The difference in properties in services and products businesses can be
leveraged in order to build more complete and competitive business models. For example,
services sales are more resilient to economic downturn, and products sales enable
explosive growth where services operations might be constrained due to their very nature
as being a people business. We have seen that the product business can generate
significant services sales. Conversely, services business can be employed to develop
channel strategies and enhance product development. Furthermore, looking at the case of
R&D expenditures, we have seen that the structure of costs in one business model or
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another might be placed in the broader context of the value chain in which a business is
situated - i.e., cost structure might be strategically considered at the scale of a value chain.
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CHAPTER 5 Framing the Question of the Performance of the Firm
In the previous chapter, we have seen how different ways of conducting a services
business and interrelating products and services might result in outcomes impacting the
performance of the firm. In other words, the business model of a firm appears to be a key
determinant of its performance. The question of what drives the performance of the firm
leads to that of its strategy. In this chapter, we shall consider the question of the
performance of the firm within the framework of its strategic management. Basing our
analysis on a strategic management framework, we shall identify key levers and variables
affecting the performance of the firm.
5.1. Theory for explaining the performance of the firm: a strategic
management framework
It is widely recognized that strategic management emerged with Alfred Chandler's
attempt at relating systematically identifiable factors with growth (1962). Since this first
attempt, strategic management has changed its methods and developed a wealth of
concepts. Still, strategic management has not steered away from its initial goal: to enable
the manager to navigate the tremendous range of situations and possible scenarios,
overcome the perplexing variations of performance observed in the market, and make
choices according to a rational analysis of the situation. Hence, for managers in general,
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and for the purpose of the present research in particular, it is worth understanding the
most accepted theories and current norms in this field.
Two streams of research have attracted much attention in the field of strategic
management and have constituted the basis of most of the current strategy literature. The
first, based on Porter's frameworks (1980, 1985, 1990, 1991) adopts an external
perspective on the firm. Porter has viewed performance of the firm as being a result of its
positioning within an industry and the environment in which it operates. A firm can
derive superior performance by choosing a strategy that provides a position advantage
relative to the market and environmental forces. The second stream of research focuses
on the firm and its resources - hence its appellation: resource-based view (RBV) of the
firm (Wernerfelt 1984; Teece 1984; Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Under the RBV,
performance of the firm is the result of the ownership and control of unique and difficult-
to-replicate assets. The literature seems to indicate a controversy as to the relative
importance of firm-specific and external environment effects on performance. It has been
reported that the first were more significant than the second (Mauri and Michaels 1998),
but Schmalensee (1985) reports that industry effects explain most of a firm's
performance variability.
Basing their framework on the two strategic management views we have just reviewed,
Saloner, Separd, and Podolny (2001) propose to analyze the dynamics of business
strategy according to the context, made of external (industry and nonmarket context) and
internal factors (assets and organization), and the actions taken (asset acquisition and
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asset deployment). It is clear that the actions taken by a firm impact the context in which
it operates. Context and actions explain the performance of the firm. This framework is
thus compatible with both the resource-based view and Porter's frameworks (see Fig. 5-
1). This framework is hereafter used to structure the analysis of the drivers of
performance specific to the IT services industry. The framework leads us to consider:
- factors related to the context:
o Externally: industry population, competition intensity, and technology
o Internally: importance of the size of the firm and how it relates to
organizational issues
- factors related to the actions:
o Asset acquisitions: intensity and purpose of the acquisitions
o Asset deployment: how the firm manages its core resource: people (we
approach this question from the angle of cost of services and sales and
marketing efforts, as well as productivity measures).
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Figure 5-1 The dynamics of business strategy
(adapted from Saloner et al. 2001)
5.2. Key drivers of performance
"Professional firms that do not grow or are unresponsive to rapid change will surely not
survive" (Webb 1982, p. 240)
Many parameters factor into the measurement of the performance of a firm. The
parameters we consider have received a significant amount of attention from
management and economic scholars. We hypothesize that several parameters of the firm
are driving performance of IT services firms: size, age, operational efficiency, business
model (mix between product and services revenues, and provision of specific services
such as outsourcing), sales and marketing intensity, acquisitions and divestitures. We
shall see how these parameters may impact the performance of an IT services firm.
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5.2.1. Growth and profitability: two key indicators of performance
First of all, it is worth noting that growth and profitability are the two performance
indicators most cited by scholars (Campbell-Hunt 2000; Capon and Farley 1990). Studies
on corporate performance are legion. A plethora of indicators have been proposed to
measure performance. Among all these, two have been repeatedly considered: growth
and profitability. In an attempt to review studies on corporate performance, Kirby (2005)
lists ten studies, among which seven are based on quantitative analysis; and among those
seven studies, as key measures of performance, two consider both net sales and net
income growth, one considers net sales growth, and one considers net income growth.
Other studies are looking at other measures of the growth rate of firms and at (stock)
market performances.
If we consider growth and profitability as key indicators, it could seem intuitive that they
are negatively related. For instance, an analyst from Baird was asserting that in 1999,
"new contracts contributed about 80% of Affiliated Computer Systems'(ACS) internal
growth. (...) ACS bids actively and aggressively to win new business, basing its pricing
decisions on detailed analysis and 11 years of experience. The company's cost-conscious
culture allows it to bid competitively (and profitability)." In other words, in the view of
the analyst, ACS was trading-off some profitability against growth. This is obviously a
simplified, if not simplistic view. However, it reflects the idea often found among
managers that growth and profit are not independent, and are negatively related.
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More fundamentally, there has been no agreement on whether there is a trade-off between
growth and profit. If such a trade-off made sense, it should be possible to observe (public)
firms pursuing different goals - which ought to be profitability maximization accordingly
to the shareholder's interests, but might also be growth maximization if this can benefit to
the management. Despite the number of studies on performance of the firm, there is no
general agreement as to the nature of the motivations and incentives that may guide
managers to pursue growth or profit maximization (Thomas 1980). While some argue
that manager's incentives - such as pecuniary rewards, status, power, etc... - lead them to
pursue growth goals (Meeks and Whittington 1975; Mueller 1972), some others argue
that managers can and will likely be pressured by their companies' shareholders to pursue
profit maximization (Thomas 1980). The main assumption underlying these results is that
growth and profit cannot be maximized independently. Consequently, there would be a
trade-off between growth and profitability (Slater 1980). On that point, a certain number
of studies failed to find any significant sign of trade-off between growth and profitability
(Geroski, Machin, and Christopher 1997; Cubbin and Leech 1986). Under certain
circumstances, growth and profit were negatively related - when the industry is mature
for instance (Day, DeSarbo, and Oliva 1987; Hatten and Schendel 1977). Capon et al.
(1990) find in their meta-analysis an overall positive relation between growth and
profitability. In the face of such controversies, we want to control for a potential
relationship between growth and profitability. We propose to consider both growth and
profitability in order to evaluate the drivers of performance of the firm.
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5.2.2. Performance and the size of the firm
The effect of size on growth could seem "mechanical" and perfectly comprehensible.
However, the relationship with growth might not be as straightforward as it seems. It has
been posited by managers and scholars that growth is related to the size of the firm.
Indeed, little is common between a 50,000-employee multinational firm and a 10 people
start-up. There are obviously stark differences that lead to fundamentally different
strategies, firm behaviors, and performances. For one thing, nobody would expect a
multinational firm to match the growth observed by many start-ups. The idea of
categorizing firms by size seems a priori very natural.
Many have defined boundaries in order to partition, or segment the market. It is not
uncommon to see a breakdown of the industry by size in analyst reports and other
publications. For instance, a widely published report (Software 500) of the top 500
performers of the software and services industry is annually published by Software
Magazine. In their growth ranking, Software 500 partitioned the industry according to
boundaries it chose (Table 5-1).
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Table 5-1 An example of IT services firm categorization: Software 500 categories for software and
services revenue growth ranking _
Size categories.
2004 and 2003
rankings <$5 $5-$10 $10-$30 $30M-$100M $100M-$l1B >$1B
(software and services
sales in $million).
Size categories.
2002 ranking Less than $30 $30M-$100M More than $100M
(software and services
sales in $million).
(source: Software Magazine)
While it could seem intuitive that growth is related to the size of the firm, there has been
little agreement on that point among scholars. Some advanced that growth is independent
of firm size (Hardwick, Philip and Mike Adams 2002; Capon, Farley, and Hoenig 1990;
Jovanovic 1982; Hymer and Pashigian 1962), but the literature is also rich in cases and
explanations in favor of inverse growth-size relationships (Evans 1987a, 1987b; Mueller
1972; Penrose 1955). In essence, these studies support or reject Gibrat's (1931) Law of
Proportionate Effects stating that proportionate organic growth rate of firms is
independent of their size.
Penrose's (1955) seminal contribution related growth to the organization. She proposed
that the need for managerial services increases at a faster rate than that of the size of the
firm, thus inducing decreasing growth returns to managerial resources. In a labor-
intensive model of business such as those of services firm, this argument has important
consequences. IT services firm which observe cost of services driven by human resources
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and typically ranging from 50% to 80% to the total revenue, could have their growth
subject to such inherent inefficiencies related to their size.
In the same time, scale also brings certain efficiency factors. For instance, large firms
benefit from a large geographic coverage which enables them to deploy operations on a
larger scale if required by a client. Local factors might be leveraged as well. A firm with
operations in India might leverage relatively low labor cost to provide services to US
firms all the while keeping a physical interface with the firm in the US. Another form of
advantage can be derived from the breadth of services offered. While a smaller firm will
focus on a certain skill set, larger firms propose a "one-stop-shop" model to their clients.
Complex and large projects associated with a high value often require a very diverse and
integrated skill set which provides advantages to typically larger firms.
From a knowledge-perspective, Ofek and Savary (2001) suggest that knowledge derived
from the customer base can enable economies of scale through the exploitation of
knowledge management systems. Such knowledge can be a source of value and
attractiveness for the customers and a competitive advantage fro the firm possessing it.
Also, because of this, it is possible that strategies to expand the customer base might
impact the growth rate of IT services firms and would account for the waves of mergers.
It might also (partly) explain the creation of inexpensive consulting services by the larger
firms.
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5.2.3. Performance and the age of the firm
It has been suggested that an old establishment would be more trustworthy, bring more
experience to the projects, and be generally more stable although being old fashioned,
lacking of innovation, and inflexible (Morgan 1991). All these characteristics induce
different types of performance. From a product life cycle theory point of view, it is
expected that most of the services offered by an "old" company will be in the mature
phase, thus yielding less growth (Kotler 1983; Mueller 1972). Several scholars observed
an inverse growth-age relation (Evans 1987; Jovanovic 1982).
5.2.4. Resource allocation and productivity
Both internally and externally oriented efforts enable success of IT services firms. From
an externally oriented viewpoint, product superiority and innovativeness is the most
important attribute enabling success (Brentani and Ragot 1996). R&D investments of IT
services firms have at least two goals: develop methodologies and new services, and
signal current and potential clients that the firm is investing in innovation. Typically, in a
situation where the market observes a "swing" in the customer needs, one might expect a
rise in R&D. For instance, after 2001, the demand (of large firms) flip-flopped from
highly-customized best-of-breed to cost-efficient standardized solutions. The new
services offerings associated with these solutions required a certain amount of
engineering. Additionally, Gartner observed in 2003 that such flip-flops occur on a
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regular basis, every 18 to 24 months. In such a situation, R&D capabilities enable IT
services firm to react faster to market changes and capture opportunities by being better
aligned with customers' needs. For smaller firms, typically focused on a few if not a
single vertical market, R&D plays the critical role of enabling the firm to put together
packaged solutions responding to specific customers' needs. It is thus expected that R&D
play a key role in the performance of IT services firms.
Client and marketing fit is the second most important factor of success noted by Brentani
and Ragot (1996). The service product should both fit with the market and with the
company supplying it. This need of fit with the customer and the company sets the firms
marketing capabilities - that is, its personnel in contact with the customer, market
analysis resources, and resources allocated to communicate with the customers - as a
critical component of IT services strategy. Sales and marketing expenses capture these
efforts.
From an internally-oriented viewpoint, capabilities, resources, and experiences drive the
performance of IT services firms. These factors both condition and are resulting from the
way the services firm allocates its resources. For instance, recruiting and training highly
specialized experts will increase the cost of services, while in the same time, might
enable the firm to offer high value services and command higher prices. In other words,
an increase in cost of services per employee might be beneficial if it enables the firm to
capture significant value at the high end of the market.
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5.2.5. External growth
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are commonly employed to generate top-line growth.
Companies such as Cisco have successfully made use of M&A to grow faster than their
rivals. A direct effect of an acquisition is the consolidation of financial statements.
However, other reasons than direct revenue increase are often invoked. M&A can bring
intellectual capital, technological resources, human capital, physical resources, and
financial resources. For IT services in particular, the main reasons are expansion in the
primary market, strengthening its existing operations, expanding its products and services
offering, and acquiring technologies and strategic assets (Fig. 5-2). It is worth noting that
while these two first purposes should provide immediate or rapid increase in revenues, an
acquisition rationalized by the third purpose might not generate any significant additional
revenue in several years after the merger. Also, it has been found that conglomerate firms
generally exhibit low performance (Christensen and Montgomery 1981; Caves, Porter,
and Spence 1980). However, acquisition strategies in the IT services industry of 1990 to
2004 were not following unrelated diversification models for the vast majority of the
deals (Fig. 5-2). Furthermore, Hopkins found that marketing-related acquisitions - that is
acquisitions of "firms whose products and services are sold in the same or similar manner,
distributed through the same or similar channels, and [using] same or similar forms of
advertising and promotion", are associated with distinctly superior position enabling
them to derive above average performances. Marketing-related firms are typically serving
the same markets. In that regard, a significant percentage (26%) of deals completed in the
IT services industry might correspond to higher performance.
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Figure 5-2 Purpose for M&A in the IT services industry
Figures are derived from 526 acquisition deals for which a deal purpose was disclosed. The deals
were completed by 240 IT services firms from 1981 to 2004.
Source: Thomson SDC Platinum
The effect of acquisitions on growth is subject to a controversy especially if growth is
considered under a long-term perspective. In particular, some studies lead to the
conclusion that mergers and acquisitions were most likely destroying value and leading to
poor performances. It has been argued that for businesses based on a "soft resource" such
as human capital, mergers were often subject to failure (Dyer, Kale, and Singh 2004).
Others suggest that long-term benefits from acquisitions are often lost, firms failing to
retain skilled people (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi 1999). Although acquisitions might
negatively impact the performance of a firm on the average, it is not excluded that
acquisition-intensive strategies could enable firms to perform. In any case, as history tells
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us (Chapter 2), it is clear that acquisitions have contributed to a large extent to
performance of some firms. For instance, in 1999, BT Alex. Brown described ACS'
growth as being equally derived from internal and external efforts with levels as high as
10% to 15% of growth attributed to each of these efforts. Furthermore, it is argued that
acquisition related to the core business activities enable above industry average net
income (Rigby 2001). In the light of our preliminary analysis of the deal purpose (Fig. 2),
IT services firms conducting acquisitions might benefit from synergies enabling above
average performances.
We might also expect that because of a mechanism of self-selection, only "good"
acquirers pursuing an intensive acquisition strategy will stay on the market. However, if
this effect might seem mechanical, the result we might obtain might be more subtle than
it seem. Indeed, if acquisition strategies are not sustainable, it might still be possible that
they could be successfully leveraged by certain categories of firms. Thus a positive
relationship between acquisition intensity and growth for certain categories of firms
would indicate successful strategies for such categories. Because size is of prime
importance in the game of growth and deals are mostly focused on expanding primary
markets, we propose that mid-size firms are trying to expand, acquire market share,
develop their power in the value chain, and possibly become more attractive to large
accounts through an acquisition strategy. We do not expect small firms to be acquisitive
or even to leverage acquisition strategies in order to grow due to their limited resources.
On the basis of our discussions with managers in the industry, larger firms might not
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leverage acquisition strategies as efficiently as medium-size firms. It is indeed much
more difficult to find deals of an adequate size for these firms.
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CHAPTER 6 Methodology and Analysis
The sample used in this study is made of 831 public companies in the US in the computer
and management services industries. We gathered financial and non-financial data from
several databases. Those included Compustat North America for financial and
operational information on firms, Thomson SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisitions
database for information on acquisition and divestitures, and EDGAR for annual reports
of the firms. We collected data from 1977 to 2004 for four SIC codes related to IT and
management services and focused the analysis on the period going from 1990 to 2004.
6.1. Choice of sample
6.1.1. Firms publicly traded on American exchange floors
Our sample of companies focused on the companies publicly traded in the American
markets. At least two reasons motivate this choice. First, information for this class of
companies is readily available under a consistent way of reporting it due to regulations.
Second, information is available for a large number of firms which enables statistical
analysis. Additionally, firms traded on American floors have to abide by certain rules that
it is worth mentioning that the US markets have historically been among the largest
geographic IT services markets (i.e. when typically compared with the Asia-Pacific
region, European and Middle-Eastern markets) and the home base of the largest global IT
services players, as well as a . In 2004, IDC Research, an IT industry analyst firm,
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attributed more than 43% of the global IT services market to the US, and 36% to Europe.
As such, a US-focused perspective enables to have a good understanding of the dynamics
of this industry at a global scale.
By considering the performance of public companies, it is possible that our results are
specifically related to the behavior of public companies. Studies on corporate governance
converge on the fact that there is no clear link between ownership structure and the
performance of a firm (Melvin and Hirt 2004; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001.)
Consequently, there should not be any significant bias on our results on performance that
relate to the nature of public companies.
6.1.2. Grouping companies by SIC codes
We selected firms associated by Compustat with four Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes related to computer and consulting services. The SIC system was developed
by the US Bureau of the Census. It indexes firms in a four-layered classification. Each
layer is comprised of 10 functional divisions (e.g. services, manufacturing, mining, etc...),
up to 10 major groups (e.g. educational services, etc...) major industries, and specific
products and services. Fig. 6-1 displays the layered architecture of the SIC system for the
codes selected for our research.
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Figure 6-1 Structure of SIC codes used for this study
As noted by several studies (Thomas, Pollock, and Gorman 1999, Szeless, Wiersema, and
Mueller-Stewens 2000), SIC codes are based on product-market identifications. Such
distinctions can adapt with difficulty to the fuzzy notion of industry boundary. Indeed, it
is not uncommon to see firms participating in multiple markets. We partly address this
concern by classifying the revenue streams of each firm that excludes revenues not
related to the computer and management services industry (see below for the description
of the classification methodology under the services, products, and other categories). We
are only partly addressing the concern of capturing an industry as a whole in the sense
that we eliminate parts of the revenue that are not related to the industry we are
considering. However, our research does not include all the firms that possibly derive
revenues from this industry. There are two reasons for this. First, we are only considering
service pure-plays (i.e. firms deriving most of their revenues from service and are not
dependent on the sale of a product). Hence, enterprise software firms such as SAP,
Oracle, or i2 are excluded from this database. Second, we are only considering public
firms for reasons already explained above.
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In order to address as much as possible the possibility of having a sample diverse enough
to capture the main industry dynamics, we considered four SIC codes, three of which
being described as covering computer services (7370, 7371, 7373), and one described as
covering consulting management services (8742). We included this last SIC due to the
close relationship between of management services and IT services. At one end of the
spectrum, management services firms are adding IT-related services, while at the other
end, the largest IT services players include all management services in their offerings
(Nolan 2002).
6.1.3. Time horizon
When considering performance of firms within an industry, the choice of time horizon is
an important question (Kirby, 2005.) From the historical perspective developed in a
preceding section, we see that the 1990s constitute in itself a period associated with its
own technologies and industry dynamics. Motivated by this observation, we focused the
study on the interval of time spanning from 1990 to 2004.
6.2. Description and preliminary analysis of the database
The final database was made of 650 companies. We considered the time period spanning
from 1990 to 2004 and discarded companies that had less than three observations in order
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to avoid bias in the fixed-effect regression. Among these 650 companies, 587 were based
in North America, 33 in Europe or Middle-Eastern, and 20 in the Asia and Pacific regions.
Four of the leading Indian IT services are present in the database (Wipro, Satyam, Infosys,
Sify, and Silverline). Altogether, they grew from 23% in 1998 of the aggregated Asia-
Pacific sales figures of the firms in our database, to 83% in 2004. The total number of
firms in our database varied widely during the period from 1990 to 2004 - from 133 in
1990 to 481 in 1999 and Asian firms only appeared in our database from 1997 (see Fig.
6-2).
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Figure 6-2 Number of firms in the database by home-base and by year, 1990-2004.
(* North-America including Caiman islands and Bermuda. ** Europe and Middle-Eastern. *** Asia-Pacific
region.)
The population of the database for the different SIC codes varies from SIC to SIC and
from year to year (see Fig. 6-3). The population of the four categories reached its
maximum in 1999, and generally shows a similar temporal evolution.
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Figure 6-3 Number of firms in the database by SIC code and by year, 1990-2004.
Essentially two databases were aggregated together. The first database gathered data from
Compustat. The data included annualized financial metrics such as net sales, gross
margin, operating margin, cost of goods sold, general and administrative expenses, and
research and development expenses. It also included headcount for most observations.
The second database was gathered using Thomson SDC Platinum. Acquisitions deals and
divestitures for the firms in our sample were collected for the period going from 1990 to
2004. Additionally, data were collected on the starting date of the firm. As in previous
studies concerned with age of firms (Mosakowski, 1991), we collected founding date
when reported, otherwise we used incorporation date. We used Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) forms 10-K and 20-F extracted from EDGAR, the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system of the SEC. The year of an observation was
adjusted according to the following rule: if the end of the fiscal year of the firm
considered ended before June 1, then the associated adjusted year was the previous year.
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This adjustment enables to minimize inconsistencies between firms related to the time of
reporting and related the disclosure to the calendar year.
In order to break down the total revenues into products and services, the firms' annual
disclosure forms of the companies (SEC forms 10-K and 20-F) were used. Revenue
break-down by segment obtained from Compustat was used. Sales disclosures under the
form of segment break-downs are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, so that
the sum of the revenues for each segment adds up to the total sales for a given period and
firm. Segment revenues were broken down into three categories: services, product, and
other. The decision of the revenue category was based either on the description of the
segment when available, on the provision of a specific break-down between product and
services per segment or for the total sales, or on the general description of the business.
The decision rule was the following: Any non-IT or consulting services related sales were
classified as other (typically, activities related to diversification strategies - e.g. mining,
garments, industrial machinery, etc...). Otherwise, if the segment revenue was primarily
derived from the sales of services, it was categorized as services, otherwise, as products.
As discussed before, the boundary between services and product can be a particularly
fuzzy concept. We considered as a product sale any sale that didn't correspond to on-
going activities. Typically, software licenses were classified as products. We considered
on-going activities as a service sale. For instance, a consulting project would correspond
to a service revenue stream. The aggregated service revenue of the firm in the database
expanded at a fast rate in the mid 1990s, and somewhat flattened in the recession period
from 2001 to 2004(Fig. 6-4). The industry clearly suffered dramatic changes that
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occurred once the internet bubble burst in 2000. It is worth noting that the products
revenues in the industry were decaying long before the internet bubble burst - from 1997,
and kept on decaying after the bubble burst, indicating a direction taken by the IT
services firms, rather than an industry reaction conditioned by economic factors.
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Figure 6-4 Aggregated services and products revenues sold by public computer and management
services firms, 1990 - 2004.
(SIC 7370, 7371, 7373, and 8742)
6.3. Assessing the performance of IT services firms
Accordingly to our analysis in Chapter 5, we consider two kinds of effects: effects related
to the context and effects related to the choices of the firm's management. According to
our analysis, the firm's performance is measured by its sales growth rate, its gross margin,
and operating margin.
At the firm level, the sales growth rate of the firm enables us to get a sense of the
dynamics of the industry by providing information on the expansion of the firms, the
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gross margin is a good proxy for operations efficiency and for most of its part accounts
for the expenses related to the headcount of the firm, and the operating margin provides
an indication of whether the business operations are overall profitable. The sales growth
rate is related to the top line of the firm, which itself is related to the headcount of the
firm, the gross margin is determined by the revenues and the cost of goods and services
sold, the operating margin fluctuates mostly accordingly to the cost of goods and services
sold, but also with sales, general, and administrative expenses, and research and
development. The effects on the performance of the firm due to these parameters have
been exposed in Chapter 5. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the business model of
a technology firm selling products and services plays an important role in its
performances. We measure the services vs. products revenue mix in order to account for
these theories. The parameters we have covered are generally determined to some extent
by the firm's management. We classify this group of variables as action variables.
Performance can also depend on structural parameters that the firm does not control,
such as its age as we have seen in Chapter 5, or its size, which we measure by the natural
logarithm of the total services and products sales8. Size, as seen in Chapter 3 and 4 is
likely to have significant effects on the growth rate of services firms. Additionally, as
discussed in Chapter 3, the past growth rate of the firm might be an impediment to its
future growth rate because of different factors exerting a resistive pressure (e.g. recruiting
skilled labor is all the more hard than the number of recruits sought is large; growing too
8 The reason for the choice of the natural logarithm of the sales rather than the sales is the fact that we
observe that the latter has a log-normal repartition (see in appendix Fig. 7-2 Repartition of firms by natural
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fast might lead to unbalanced organizations, with a large bottom of pyramid; recruiting
generate significant costs including training).
Eventually, the firm interacts with its environment. Following the ecological population
theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977), we used the total number of firms as a measure of
density. Density measures the competitive pressure within a given industry. In order to
account for the industry considered, we used the count of firms in our database for each
primary SIC code. We included all firms in this count, including those with missing
financial information. As suggested in Chapter 2, the economic context played a
significant role on the performance of IT services firms. During and after the year 2000,
the economy brutally slowed down. After this economic shock, the industry entered into
a period of lackluster earnings. We account for such exogenous shocks by considering
dichotomous variables for the Y2K, and for the recession that followed in 2001-2003.
The empirical variables we used are summarized in Table 6-1. The corresponding
conceptual model is displayed in Appendix in Fig. 7-4.
logarithm of services and products sales) which enables to derive more accurate results from the
regressions we conduct with this variable.
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Table 6-1 Variable definitiom
Variable
Performance variables
(Future) sales growth
Operating margin
Gross margin
Firm action variables
Service %
R&D %
COGS %
SGA%
Acquisitions
Firm structural variables
Age
LN sales
Sales growth rate
Environmental variables
Density
Y2K (1999-2000)
Recession (2001-03)
* services and products sales
Is
Definition
Growth rate of services and products sales from the current year to the next
year.
Operating margin (current year)
Gross margin (current year)
Service revenues as a percentage of services and products sales.
Research and development expense as a percentage of services and
products sales.
Cost of goods and services sold as a percentage of services and products
sales.
Sales, general, and administrative expense as a percentage of services and
products sales.
Number of acquisitions conducted in the current year.
Age of the firm since its inception.
Natural logarithm of services and products sales*
Growth rate of products and services sales
Number of competitors within the same primary SIC code of the firm
considered
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 for the years 1999 and 2000, 0
otherwise.
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 for the years 2001 to 2003, 0 otherwise.
are measured in million dollars
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 6-2 thereafter are interesting to compare with
those obtained by Cusumano et al. (2006) on an equivalent database composed of firms
classified under the SIC code 7372, prepackaged software (see Table 6-3 in appendix).
The first comment is that, as expected, the gross margin of pure services firms is on
average lower than those of software firms. As discussed in Chapter 4, the business
model of a products firm is based on the fact that the marginal cost of production of
products (when mass produced) is expected to be low, while service firms' revenues and
profits depend on the volume of personnel working for the firm and account for most of
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the cost of goods and services sold. Sales, general and administrative expenses seem to be
equivalent, except that software firms vary much more in their range of sales expenses,
which corresponds to the observation that the products business model might have much
higher sales and marketing expenses than services firms. Interestingly, R&D expenditures
of IT services firms seem much higher than those of software firms, with a much higher
variability too. Our interpretation of this result corresponds to the remarks at the end of
Chapter 4: products firms' innovation is based on a more regular scheme - a product firm
needs to continually innovate, while an IT services firmnn might innovate on a less regular
basis; besides, mostly small firms innovated. The situation is illustrated by a graph in
appendix (see Fig. 6-5 Scatter plot of R&D % (Y-axis) vs. LN sales (X-axis) in
Appendix): firms below 20 million dollars in revenues tend to innovate much more than
those above 20 million dollars. Besides, it is interesting to note the downward trend of the
envelope of the scatter plot after 20 million dollars, which goes from around 50% at 20
million dollars (if we ignore the few points above 50%9) and decreases to close to single
digit percentages for the largest firms.
9 Even if we keep these points, the reasoning is unchanged: the envelope decreases to 0. But on average, the
trend corresponds more to the description made, ignoring the points over 50% of R&D above $20 million.
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Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics (IT services firms)
Variable Count Mean Standard Median Min Max
Deviation
Performance variables
(Future) sales growth 3600 2.13 24.52 .16 -1.00 929.67
Operating margin 4530 -6.04 75.16 -.02 -3346.00 0.87
Gross margin 4534 -3.55 70.14 .37 -3214.00 1.00
Firm action variables
Service % 4239 0.80 0.36 1.0 0.00 1.00
R&D % 2573 1.24 19.25 .09 0.00 864.75
COGS % 4534 4.55 70.14 .63 0.00 3215.00
SGA % 3993 2.35 19.53 .42 0.03 617.75
Acquisitions 4540 0.48 1.38 0 0.00 29.00
Firm structural variables
Age 3895 14.56 12.34 12.0 1.00 116.00
LN sales 4239 3.11 2.34 3.16 -6.91 9.98
Sales growth rate 3705 2.08 24.17 .16 -1.00 929.67
Environmental variables
Density 4540 150.56 84.74 103 8.00 299.00
Y2K (1999-2000) 4540 0.21 0.40 0 0.00 1.00
Recession (2001-03) 4540 0.23 0.42 0 0.00 1.00
* services and products sales are measured in million dollars
6.4. Results
In this section, we attempt to develop a quantitative analysis of the drivers of
performance of IT services firms. We analyze the data collected in our database on more
than 800 firms. Although we consider all the firms when evaluating the density of the
industry and use this data in our regression model, due to lagging variables and missing
observations because of incomplete financial data, the regression analysis is practically
conducted on 478 firms. We focus on the period 1990 to 2004.
In order to establish causality, time precedence is primordial (Asher, 1976). We thus
consider the "future" sales growth rate between the year considered and the next year, all
the variables being taken at the year considered (which is equivalent to considering the
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"current" sales growth rate, and lag all the other variables). For operating profit and
operating margin, we consider lagged variables: R&D, acquisitions, cost of goods and
services sold, sales, general and administrative expense are lagged when used in the
regression. However, structural and environmental variables were not lagged due to the
simultaneity of their impact on the performance of the firm.
We used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with fixed effects. Table 6-3 displays
the regression models we use to derive the relationship between the key drivers of
performance identified in prior chapters and the performance of the firm, as measured by
its services and products sales growth rate, operating margin, and gross profit. Interaction
terms with the size of the firms were taken into account.
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Table 6-3 Drivers of performance of IT services firms
Dependent Variable (Future) Sales Operating Gross
(i) Growth Margin Margin
Firm variables
Service %
COGS % - lag (i)
SGA % - lag (ii)
Acquisitions - lag (ii)
Structural variables
Age
LN sales
Sales growth rate - lag (ii)
Environmental variables
Density
Y2K (1999-2000)
Recession (2001-03)
Interaction terms
Service % * LN sales (i)
COGS % * LN sales (i) - lag
(ii)
SGA % * LN sales (i) - lag
(ii)
Acquisitions * LN sales (i)
- lag (ii)
Age * LN sales (i)
Density * LN sales (i)
Constant
Rho
F-test
N
NOTES:
-0.107
(0.0869)
-0.00002**
(0.00001)
0.025***
(0.0030)
0.0002***
(0.00008)
0.020***
(0.0037)
-0.0005
(0.00033)
4.347***
(0.4224)
.99
742.8***
2384
Standard deviations are in parenthesis; *** = P-value < .01,
(i) 'sales' stands for the sales of IT products and services
-0.738
(0.4888)
0.000
(0.0004)
0.082***
(0.0178)
-0.001*
(0.0004)
-0.197***
(0.0231)
0.01 1***
(0.0019)
-21.044***
(2.5038)
.68
3.93***
2368
0.31
(0.193)
0.03***
(0.007)
0.00
(0.000)
-0.01
(0.009)
0.00***
(0.001)
0.414
(0.9829)
.72
5.74***
2368
** = P-value < .05, *=P-value <. I1
(ii) The 'lag' mention only stands for regressions with operating margin and gross margin as dependent variable.
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0.173
(0.3552)
-0.045
(0.0478)
0.111***
(0.0157)
0.061**
(0.0261)
-0.019
(0.0298)
-1.246***
(0.1018)
-0.002
(0.0022)
0.0032*
(0.00166)
-0.173
(0.1224)
-0.399**
(0.1773)
3.992*
(2.0829)
0.000
(0.0037)
0.451**
(0.0832)
-0.225
(0.1499)
0.917**
(0.1274)
5.248***
(0.6045)
0.116***
(0.0121)
-0.055***
(0.0092)
-0.818
(0.6078)
-1.142**
(0.5551)
-1.10
(0.822)
0.14***
(0.033)
-0.07
(0.059)
0.10**
(0.050)
-0.097
(0.2340)
0.00
(0.005)
-0.02***
(0.004)
-0.18
(0.241)
-0.54**
(0.219)
From this regression, we observe that sales, general, and administrative expense plays a
significant and critical role in the business of an IT services firm and enables higher
growth, gross profit, and operating profits than average, all other things being equal. The
interaction terms indicate that these returns increase with the size of the firm measured by
the natural logarithm of its products and services sales. All these results are obtained with
a high level of confidence (the associated P-values are less than .01). For firms between 1
million dollars and 2 billion dollars, on average, an additional percent of revenue spent in
sales general and administrative expense is likely to transcribe into .1 to .2 additional
percent of sales growth rate the next year, from .4 to 1 additional percent of operating
margin, and from .1 to .4 additional percent of gross margin - the lower bounds
corresponding to what would be observed for smaller firms, and the upper bounds, what
would be observed for larger firms.
Another important determinant of performance is the size of the firm. As the firm grows,
its growth rate decreases on average. However, and supporting the point developed in
Chapter 3 and 4, as firms grow, they gain market power and become more efficient and
profitable. More specifically, it is interesting to note that only the operating margin
depends on the size of the firm - the size of the firm is not statistically relevant to the cost
of goods and services.
Unsurprisingly, acquisitions conducted in a previous year enabled growth. The positive
sign of the interaction term suggests that acquisitions play a more significant role on the
sales growth rate for larger firms. The reason for this is straightforward. Smaller firms are
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run under more stringent resource constraints than larger firms and are less prone to
conducting acquisitions. Besides, acquisition might not be among the best growth options
of smaller firms. Also, the larger the firm, the less interesting is the acquisition in terms
of operating profits. This relates to the fact that, as already analyzed, larger IT services
firms are also more profitable than smaller firms. Thus, the acquisition of a smaller firm
will likely have the immediate effect of partially "diluting" profits.
Environmental parameters play a significant role. A high density (which is: a high
number of firms competing with each other), as expected, leads to lower gross and
operating margins. On the supply-side, this can find causes in the fact that an increase in
density leads to an increase in competition for the recruitment of skilled labor. And on the
customer side, an increase in competition typically translates into price competition,
competition for the delivery of more value to the customer, and increased sales and
marketing pressure. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that larger firms are more
immune to density increases as shown by the positive interaction terms between size and
density. This observation corroborates with the fact that larger firms address different
clients, or different client needs than smaller firms (see Chapter 3). Another remark on
density is that it might have a positive impact on the average sales growth. At first sight
this may seem odd, but it might simply be the result of the fact that small firms entering
the market might have much higher growth rates than larger firms as demonstrated earlier
(see also the Analysis of the influence of the size of the firm on its growth rate in
appendix). An increase in density corresponding with the entry of small firms thus
induces the industry average growth rate to increase.
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IT services firms were immune to the bubble bust as show by the non significance of the
Y2K variable. However, they were subject to the slow economy that followed, with their
sales growth rate 40% less than what they observed prior to this period; operating margin
were 114% less, and gross margin were 50% less.
Eventually, the age of the firm explains its operating and gross margins. The older the
firm, the more profitable it is. As companies become older, they are also likely to be
more recognized and build reputation and trust. Such effect likely translates into premium
pricing (see Chapter 3). Additionally, the larger the firm, the less the effect of age on the
firm's operating margin. This can be interpreted by the fact that a firm with
Besides, for a given age, the larger the firm, the larger its growth rate is. In other words,
young firms that grew faster than their peers will grow even faster in the future. Also, for
a younger firm, age is synonymous with experience, but for an older firm, age can be
pejorative and associated with rigidity. It is not evident that the relationship between age
and the different performance metrics holds for particularly old firms, for instance.
We have seen in Chapters 2 and 4 that there are significant interactions between the
business of products and that of services. In particular, the software business is linked
with the IT services business function on the basis of mostly symbiotic links. It is thus
interesting to compare these two industries. Table 6-4 shows a comparison of
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corresponding regressions between public IT services firms from our database, and public
software firms from another database grouping firms from the SIC code 737210°.
If we consider the regressions for the IT services firms in Table 6-4, the set of variables
slight differ from those in the regressions described above. One important remark on the
IT services firm database is that the variable R&D % was missing for a significant
number of observations (for about 42% of the observations). However, so as to be
consistent with the regressions calculated on the software database, the variable R&D %
was added to the following regressions. Furthermore, as opposed to the previous
regressions, we do not take into account interaction terms. The results of the regressions
on the IT services firms database are thus changed. However, there is a certain
consistency among the results for the firm and environmental variables, to the exception
of the effect of sales, general, and administrative expense on operating margins, which is
changed. In this exception, the result is obtained with a lower level of confidence than in
our previous regression and we suggest dismissing this result. Other variables that were
significant in both regressions had the same sign. Some variables that were statistically
significant in our previous regressions were not in the regressions of Table 6-4:
- When considering sales growth rate as the dependent variable:
i. SGA%
ii. Sales growth rate
iii. Density
- When considering operating margin as the dependent variable:
10 The regression on the software database was kindly provided by Steven J. Kahl
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i. Gross margin
ii. Age
iii. Sales growth rate
- When considering operating margin as the dependent variable:
i. SGA%
ii. Age
The fact that these variables were non significant in the second set of regressions is most
likely due to the fact that many observations were taken off the sample in the second
regression. Indeed, except for gross margin and density for a few variables, all these
variables were found significant with a high level of confidence in the regression of Table
6-3. A few variables that were not significant in our previous regression were significant
in the regression of Table 6-4 where the future sales growth rate was taken as the
independent variable:
- Age
- Sales growth rate
Overall, there is a strong consistency among the significant variables of the two sets of
regressions on the IT services database. A few effects seem to be inversed in the second
regression, but these results are obtained with a lower level of confidence and we dismiss
them. As for the software database sample, the number of observations is closer to the
one that was observed in the first set of regressions of Table 6-3. We shall comment on
the variables that were consistent between the two regressions.
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Table 6-4 Comnarative analysis!: the drivers of nerformnce of IT servies and anftwarp firms
Dependent Variable
Database
Firm variables
Gross margin - lag (iii)
SGA % - lag (iii)
R&D % - lag (iii)
Structural variables
Age
LN sales (ii)
Sales growth rate - lag
(ii, iii)
Environmental variables
Density
Y2K (1999-2000)
Recession (2001-03)
Constant
Rho
F-test
N
NOTES:
(Future) Sales (ii)
Growth Rate
IT (iv) SOFT (iv)
-0.09*
(0.049)
-0.01
(0.010)
0.18**
(0.084)
0.07**
(0.031)
-1.01***
(0.061)
0.01**
(0.003)
0.001
(0.0014)
-0.11
(0.151)
-0.49**
(0.224)
3.55***
(0.364)
.99
-8.25
(6.401)
-7.35***
(2.811)
-1.17
(3.914)
2.47***
(0.430)
-17.23***
(1.321)
-0.12***
(0.020)
0.16*
(0.087)
-1.98
(2.721)
2.89
(2.299)
150.21***
(15.633)
.39
1230*** 1.23***
1460 2094
Operating Margin
IT (iv) SOFT (iv)
-0.06
(0.123)
-0.10**
(0.048)
0.83***
(0.253)
-0.04
(0.045)
1.55***
(0.150)
0.00
(0.007)
-0.006**
(0.0028)
-0.47
(0.329)
-0.54*
(0.305)
-4.83***
(0.862)
.94
-2.25***
(0.650)
0.16
(0.285)
-0.80**
(0.397)
-0.03
(0.044)
0.17
(0.134)
0.00
(0.002)
0.00
(0.009)
0.04
(0.276)
-0.61'**
(0.233)
-0.33
(1.587)
.30
24.4*** 1.58***
1452 2094
Gross Margin
IT (iv) ' SOFT(iv)
-0.04
(0.054)
1.02***
(0.306)
0.06
(0.055)
0.71***
(0.183)
0.00
(0.009)
-0.006*
(0.0034)
-0.31
(0.400)
-0.96***
(0.370)
-2.23**
(1.045)
.75
0.006
(0.0100)
-0.050***
(0.0144)
0.002
(0.0017)
-0.021 ***
(0.0051)
0.000
(0.0001)
0.000
(0.0003)
-0.028***
(0.0106)
-0.019**
(0.0090)
0.863***
(0.0587)
.66
5.49*** 7.19***
1452 2094
Standard deviations are in parenthesis; *** = P-value < .01, ** = P-value < .05, *=P-value < .1
(i) 'X' = variable not included in the regression
(ii) 'sales' stands for the sales of IT products and services
(iii) The 'lag' mention only stands for regressions with operating margin and gross margin as dependent variable.
(iv) IT = IT services firms, SOFT = software firms
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It is interesting to note that while the performance of IT services firms was not subject to
the bubble bust, software firms suffered gross margin losses at a high level of confidence
as shown by the negative coefficient of the Y2K coefficient of the software gross margin
regression. This likely indicates a decrease in revenues. Indeed, software firms faced little
costs of goods sold (see Chapter 4) and their gross margins were mostly driven by their
revenues. Nonetheless, both IT services and software firms faced margin pressure during
the recessions that followed. This observation supports the thesis of a products-services
lifecycle paradigm developed in Chapter 4: the sales of services follow the sales of
products. If services firms seemed to be resilient to sudden economic shocks, they were
also facing difficulties during economic downturn due to downsizing effects (in terms of
employees) in order to adjust the capacity to the demand level. A negative sign on the
coefficient of the recession variable for the regression with future sales growth rate of IT
services firms supports this viewpoint.
There is a striking difference between IT services and software firms when we consider
the effect of R&D efforts on profitability. On average, an increase in R&D as a percent of
sales has a negative effect on operating and gross margins for software firms, and a
positive effect for IT services firms, the levels of confidences being high for these results.
It is clear that the focus on R&D is much more important in software firms whose focus
is typically on developing and selling products, as opposed to IT services firms whose
focus is on providing services. IT services firms might employ their R&D in order to
develop new methodologies and processes, and more generally, tools that can be used in
order to improve the efficiency of the process of delivering services. Because R&D is
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typically not part of the focus of IT services firms, developing an intellectual capital base
is likely to confer competitive advantages by enabling firms to differentiate themselves.
Indeed, an increase in R&D mostly impacts the gross margin: the cost of services is likely
to be diminished by more efficient processes, or the pricing of the offerings might be
subject to a premium. As for the software firms, R&D is much more common. The
amplitude of the impact on the gross margin is not extremely high and increases in R&D
expenses impact negatively the operating margin. For software finrms, R&D is a cost that
has to be managed in an efficient way and does not provide any competitive advantage
per se.
The larger the revenue (as measured by LN sales), the slower the future growth. This is
true for both IT services firms and software firms. Also, it is interesting to note the
difference in amplitude of the effects. The effect seems to be an order of magnitude
higher for software firms. This seems to supports the fundamental difference in the
business models of (IT) services firms and (software) products firms underlined in
Chapter 4: software firms' business model is mostly based on the sales of a "best-seller"
which sales can relatively easily be displaced by those of competitors' products -
exception being made for a few platform vendors. IT services firms' sales are related to
the number of employees of these firms. A large sale at a given year is unlikely to change
much in a following year due to the longer sales cycles of the IT services industry.
There are a few more variables that play a statistically significant role in the software
business. Those variables cannot be directly compared with those in the regressions on
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the IT services firms database of Table 6-4 because of the remarks made p.96 (that is:
there are discrepancies in the results in the regressions on the IT services database
displayed in table 6-3 and 6-4), but might be interesting to consider. In order to comment
these results, we consider the interpretation provided when commenting Table 6-3.
Contrary to IT services firms, sales, general, and administrative seems not to be a
determinant of performance of software firms - and might even hurt their sales growth
rate. The reason behind this might be the same as for R&D: such expenses are generally
important in software firms and little differentiation might be achieved through
incremental spending in such expenses.
Interestingly, and with a high level of confidence, we see that software firms might grow
faster as they mature. It is also interesting to note that Cusumano, Kahl, and Sudrez (2006)
find that software firms migrate towards services as they mature. These two results
combined together could indicate that software firms might be able to better maintain and
increase their sales rate of growth by increasingly providing services. In the regression in
Table 6-3, we found with a high level of confidence that IT services firms were growing
slower as they matured. A priori this contrast is contradictory, but might be based on a
difference in business models: IT services firms provide a different set of services than
software firms. One important distinction is the focus of services, typically centered on
the products offerings of software firms, and usually as broad as possible for (large) IT
services firms. Products firms might thus leverage synergies with services components of
their offerings and become increasingly efficient in generating new revenue streams from
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new products or service sales. Additionally, a service capability might help software
firms develop and channel more efficiently new products to their existing customers.
6.5. Conclusion
As compared to products businesses, services businesses have their strengths and
weaknesses which depend on the context in which firms interact. The fundamental
difference between an IT services firm and a software firm is that the first one is a people
business, while the second one is an innovation business. The first one is mostly focused
on operations efficiency and quality of services, while the second one is mostly focused
on the development and sales of its products. These characteristics lead to different levers
of performance. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the core levers of performance
of IT services firms are playing in opposite directions for software firms, and vice versa.
While sales, general and administrative expenses, most often accounting for sales efforts,
likely enhances the performance of IT services firms through growth and profitability, it
does not do so for software firms. While on average, incremental R&D efforts enable IT
services firms to increase their profitability, they diminish the operating margin potential
of software firms. These differences seem to indicate some incompatibilities between the
business models of products and services firms.
However, our analysis suggests that products firms developing services might generate a
more sustainable growth. Besides, if in long periods of economic downturn, both IT
services and software firms suffer, IT services firms seem to absorb economic shocks
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better than software firms. Combining products and services can enable businesses to
develop a business model based on after-sale services, which can also be used to develop
and channel new products.
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Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics of key operational variables of software firm
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev min max
Total Sales 4352 246732.6 31293 1419353 0 3.98E+07
Product Contribution 3378 0.597998 0.603383 0.257145 0 1
Gross Margin 4042 0.599959 0.685644 1.166553 -54 0.998602
R&D% 3939 0.700689 0.187817 5.498273 0 156.947
SGA% 4255 2.356366 0.531747 38.85322 0.00316 1967.041
Operating Income 4331 -2.78245 -0.038011 41.30814 -1966.041 0.969611
Age 4449 12.39357 11 7.484274 1 48
Market Cap 3018 2157.288 135.5 18510.05 0 596476
(source: Cusumano et al. 2006)
Table 7-2 Description statistics of key operational variables of IT services firm
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Median ]
Services and products
sales
Services sales
Products sales
Gross profit
Operating income
COGS
SGA
R&D
Employees
Sales/employee
COGS/employee
SGA/employee
Market cap
4540
4540
4540
4534
4534
4538
3994
2574
3942
3912
3911
3478
3770
210.6576 1140.015 22.6
187.9639
22.69366
66.09885
3.098872
154.8043
53.93896
9.124002
1.641913
158.5083
132.1287
104.2087
613.2749
1130.632
134.9148
314.3329
157.4358
875.3445
169.5865
26.58674
8.153512
349.6157
362.3979
312.8759
3572.912
13.4
0
8.6
-.15
14.4
13.5
2.06
.22
116.5
72.5
63.9
43.3
vin
0
0
0
-1988.4
-2643.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Max
21543
21543
2911.889
5501.579
2511.481
17997
3181.319
395.164
143
10870.4
8213.903
10976
115267.5
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Figure 74 Model of the drivers of performance of IT services and products firms
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Environmental Parameters
Competition I Market Contingency
Structural Parameters of the Firm
Size
Past Growth Rate
Age
.
Business Model
Services vs. Products
N
0C
Sales Growth Rate
Gross Margin
Operatinrgi
if0.C
External Growth Strategy
Acquisitions
Table 7-3 Correlation tables
(obs=1379}
pssalesgl
servp
rdp
cogs
sg&P
acquisitions
age
lnp sales
psaalesg
sicpop
yl999y2000
y200ly2003
servplnp5s
rdplnpss
pssal-gl
1.0000
0.0868
0.2657
-0.0457
0.1717
0.0167
-0.1326
-0.2301
0.1149
0.1140
0.0863
-0.0848
-0.1199
-0.1142
servp
1.0000
0.0477
0.0660
0.0253
0.0894
-0.0436
0.0928
0.0494
0.2199
0.1399
0.2074
0.6770
-0.0322
rdp
1.0000
-0.0434
0.5617
-0.0344
-0.0762
-0.2721
0.0357
0.0848
0.0556
0.0179
-0.1941
-0.7716
cogs
1.0000
-0.0358
0.2020
0.1135
0.4350
-0.0156
-0.0825
0.0158
0.0806
0.3668
-0.0050
sgap acqui-ns
1.0000
-0.0337
-0.0665
-0.3175
0.0427
0.0472
0.0550
-0.0209
-0.1636
-0.3936
1.0000
0.1196
0.3581
-0.0049
0.1367
0.0939
0.0342
0.3081
0.0293
cogsplnpss
acquisiti-ss
L1.
agelnpss
sicpoplnpss
-0.0371 0.0599
-0.0459
-0.1325
-0.1064
0.0720
0.0043
0.1742
-0.0353 0.9939
-0.0364
-0.1138
-0.1772
0.9050
0.2397
0.1572
-0.0288 0.1822 0.0825
-0.0310
-0.1145
-0.1608
0.2321
0.2214
0.3436
0.1349
0.9208
0.0853
lnpsaleis
pszalesg
sicpop
yl999y2000
y2001y2003
servplnpis
rdplnpss
cogsplnpst
acquisiti-s~
L1.
agelnps:
s icpoplnps:,
lnpssa-G psalesg
1.0000
-0.0615
0. 0098
0.0206
0.1248
0.7053
0.1403
0.3749
1.0000
0.0941
0.0790
-0.0438
-0.0234
0.0118
-0.0129
0.4055 -0.0180
0.5355 -0.0488
0.6658 -0.0109
sicpop y19-2000 y20-2003 servpl-s rdplnpss
1.0000
0.4074
-0.0526
0.1175
0.03229
-0.0841
1.0000
-0.3381
0.0882
0.0367
0.0114
-0.0396 -0.0053
-0.0995 -0.0478
0.6559 0.2696
1.0000
0.2090
-0.0327
0.0790
1.0000
0.0987 1.0000
0.3250 -0.0051
0.1323 0.3573 0.0073
0.0440 0.3355 0.0187
0.0479 0.5420 0.1287
cogsplnps s
acquisiti-ss
L1.
agelnps s
sicpoplnps s
(obs=1444.)
L.
cogspl-s acqui-ss agelnpss icpop-s
1.0000
0.9209
0.1922
0.1120
1.0000
0.2543
0.1890
1.0000
0.2839 1.0000
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age
1.0000
0.3012
-0.0684
-0.1766
-0.0837
0.0267
0.1564
-0.0091
-
-
operatingm-n
grosznargin
rdp
cogs
L1.
sgap
L1.
acquisit$ons
L1.
agelnpssalespssalesg
L1.
sicpop
y1999y2000
y2001y2003
servplnpas
rdplnpas
cogsplnpss
L1.
acqUisiti-ss
L1.
agelnpss
sicpoplnpus
operat-n grossa-n
1.0000
0 . 7271
-0.0266
-0 .7624
1.0000
-0.0288
-0.7637
servp
1.0000
0.0341
L. L. L.
rdp cogs sgap acqLd- U
1.0000
0.0279 0.0045 0.0736 -0.0365 1.0000
-0.3231 -0.1301 0.0813 0.2855 -0.0430 1.0000
0.0304
O. 0505
0.2968
-0.0385
-0 . 03274
-0.0080
-0.0194
0.1652
0. 7640
0. 0176
0.0090
0.1263
-0.0182
-0.0241
0. 0129
-0. 0428
O. 0921
0.9457
0.0835
-0.0461
0.1321
0.0326
0.1909
0.0710
0.1994
0.6887
-0.0391
-0.0308
-0.0501
-0.3606
0.0358
0.0321
-0.0016
0.0317
-0.1909
-0.8565
0.1771
0.1073
0.4308
-0.0178
-0 .0950
0.002233
0.0524
0.3623
-0.0016
-0.0306
-0.0849
-0.2336
0. 0599
0.1036
0.0514
0.0291
-0.1410
-0.1488
1.0000
0.1118
0.3623
-0.0105
0.1381
0.0677
0.0463
0.3013
0.0329
0.0227 0.0037 0.0666 -0.0297 0.9943 -0.0350 0.1609
0 . 0275
0.1117
0. 1605
0.0098
0.0445
0.1034
0.0803
0.0108
0.1929
-0.0321
-0.1107
-0.1736
0.90239
0.2374
0 .13221
-0.0368
-0.1153
-0.1201
0.2554
0 .2256
0.3431
age
lnpssales
pasalesg
L1.
sicpap
y1999y2000
y2001y2003
servplnpss
rdplnpss
cogsplnpas
L1.
acquisiti-ss
L1.
agelnpss
sicpoplnpas
age lnpssa-s
1.0000
0.23538
-0.0716
-0.1784
-0 .0750
-0.0301
0. 1169
-0.0121
L.
pssalesg sicpop y19-2000 y20-2 003 servpl-s
1.0000
-0.0153
0. 0421
0.0472
0.0399
0.7226
0.1539
1.0000
0.0749
0.0556
-0.0144
0.0033
0.0011
1.0000
0.39322
-0.0014
0.1317
0.0081
1.0000
-0.3443
0.0709
0.0341
1.0000
0.1375
-0.0219
0.0768 0.3657 -0.0147 -0.0953 0.0009g 0.0490 0.3231
0.1079
0.9156
0.0393
0.4167
0.3240
0.6528
-0.0133 -0.0441 -0.0094 0.0858
-0.0487 -0.0983 -0.0357 -0.0113
0.0291 0.6975 0.2963 0.0147
rdplnpss
cogsplnpss
L1.
acquisiti-ss
L1.
agelnps
sicpoplnpss
L. L.
rdplnpss cogspl-s acqui-ss ageps sicpop-s
1.0000
-0.0033 1.0000
0.0103
0.0372
0.1387
0.9153
0.1908
0.0834
1.0000
0 .23382
0.1778
1.0000
0.23581 1.0000
108
1.0000
0.1053
0.3686
0.3353
0.5397
-
l
Analysis of the influence of the size of the firm on its growth rate
Size plays a structural role in the way firms grow. While scholars were unable to find a
common ground of agreement when considering the issue from a general viewpoint (i.e.
non-industry specific), we shall first try to analyze whether the size of a firm had an
impact on growth for the specific case of our industry. For this analysis we use the
natural logarithm of the total product and services sales. We estimated the following
regression equation where size of the firm and its powers are the only parameter:
pssalesglit = Po + 3ilnpssit + f321npss2it + P31npss3it + P41npss4it + 351snpss5it + ai + it
We found with high levels of confidence an overall negative relationship with size (1<O).
Possible interpretations as we have already seen could be related to negative (growth)
return to scale on management, growing complexity of managing a corporation that is
expending its offerings, inefficiencies related to the management of knowledge, and
difficulty to hire (highly) skilled labor above a certain point for a given geography
(typically, middle management hiring is often considered by large firms as being a
bottleneck of growth).
Not assuming a linear behavior between size and growth provided us with additional
information which an explanation merely based on negative return to scale would not
explain. Indeed, considering points where lnpss is greater than 5, we observe that the
polynomial function in lnpss increases (Fig. 7-5), which means that on average, growth
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increases with size. This is contradictory with an explanation based on negative return to
scale. Other effects might factor in. For instance, from discussions with managers in the
IT services industry, it seems that larger firms are often better positioned to capture the
largest contracts. Additionally, we have seen that there are efficiencies in being a large
firm such as visibility, and also as a result that size can be used as a proxy to reputation of
the firm (Chapter 3).
From our regression analysis, we obtain the following sizes (in terms of total products
and services sales):
- $133 million
- $523 million
- $1.6 billion
These boundaries are obviously not "absolute" in the sense that a firm under or above any
of these sizes would radically modify its behaviors. Rather, it is possible to observe a
continuum of behaviors across the industry.
l pssalesg 1 is the future growth rate of sales; lnpssk is the natural logarithm of sales raised to the power of
k
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Figure 7-5 Future growth rate dependence on a polynomial function of the size of the firm (as
measured by its natural logarithm of its product and services sales)
Categorization has been employed in the industry for legal and statistical purposes
(OECD 2004). Although it is the case in EU, there are no standard definitions in Canada
and in the US. Legally, EU considers any firm with more than 250 employees and more
than 50 million euros in annual revenues, more than 43 million in assets as a large
enterprise. Under the same rules, a medium enterprise has 50 to 240 employees, revenues
ranging from 10 to 50 million euros and from 10 to 43 million in assets. 1 2 Japan
distinguishes between industries. In particular, for service industries, the boundary of 100
persons and 50 million yen in capital and investments is employed. The diversity of
definitions is related to specific political strategies and economic conditions. Nonetheless,
as far as growth is concerned, it is important to note that the size of a firm shall be
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considered on a logarithmic scale. Thus the apparent heterogeneity in the classification
systems we reviewed is actually small. However, even though these categories are
consistent between each other, they seem to have little basis on statistical analysis.
Furthermore, these categories are not industry-specific and have thus little relevance as
scholar have already showed (Hardwick, Philip and Mike Adams 2002; Capon, Farley,
and Hoenig 1990; Jovanovic 1982; Hymer and Pashigian 1962). More interesting is the
classification established (most likely empirically and not necessarily on the basis of any
statistical analysis) by the Software 500 ranking for the software and services business.
This classification proposes the following boundaries:
- $5 millions
- $10 millions
- $30 millions
- $100 millions
- $1 billion
The natural logarithms of $100 million and $133 million (when the unit is a million
dollars) are relatively different by only 6%. The same stands for $1 billion and $1.6
billion. The category we obtained by our analysis thus shares two boundaries with
Software 500. The category we propose exhibit an intermediary boundary but no sub-
categories for smaller firms.
12 according to the European Commission recommendation 2003/361/EC
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